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EDUCATION AS REGIME CHANGE IN ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 
by 
William J. Nunnally, Jr. 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2015 
 Aristotle’s Politics is a study of political science, established by Aristotle as the practical 
science of all things related to the polis, the highest human community, with the purpose of 
securing and promoting the good life, that of noble action and happiness, for its citizens. 
Aristotle observes that the political communities in existence around him all fall short of this lofty 
goal, and much of the Politics and subsequent commentary on the Politics is an attempt to 
establish what type of regime is best able to achieve this highest end of the polis. This paper 
argues that the relationship between the end of the city, the happiness of its citizens, and the 
methods used to achieve that end are reciprocal, and that as such only the ideal form of regime 
change is capable of producing the ideal regime. Through an analysis of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, the Politics, and the Constitution of Athens, this study demonstrates that there is, 
according to Aristotle, only one proper method of regime change: education. Through proper 
education, of both the young and the old, both civic and intellectual, in what is noble and what is 
useful, the regime is able to progress towards the ideal regime simply. This ideal regime simply, 
then, is the rule of the virtuous multitude, in which all citizens of the city have achieved full 
virtue. Given that this may in fact be impossible, it is also apparent that it is only through proper 
education that the best regime possible is reached; any regime that has the ability, through 





Aristotle begins the Politics with the syllogism that “every city is some sort of partnership, 
and that every partnership is constituted for the sake of some good,” concluding that the 
partnership that aims at the highest good “is called the city or political partnership.”1 In his first 
two sentences Aristotle establishes the purpose of politics, working together in partnership 
towards the highest good, and thereby also establishes the metric by which all political 
communities are to be judged—the extent to which the community aims at and is able to realize 
the highest good. Much of the inquiry into Aristotle’s thought has focused on the form of political 
community, or regime, that is best able to achieve the end of promoting happiness, or 
eudaimonia, and Aristotle himself seems to understand that this would be the case. He himself 
devotes much of the Politics to this question, and acknowledges “it is through hunting for 
[happiness] in a different manner and by means of different things that [groups of] individuals 
create ways of life and regimes that differ.”2 The dispute over the best way of life, and the 
highest good, forms the central focus of ethical investigation just as the regime that best suits 
this highest good forms the central focus of political investigation.  
It follows that the question of Aristotle’s ideal regime type should occupy much attention, 
but Aristotle implies that there are two components to the study of the ideal regime—the best 
regime itself, as the goal towards which all regimes should strive (whether this is the best 
regime we can pray for or the best regime simply), as well as the process by which any given 
regime can change and progress towards its proper end. Aristotle goes so far as to aver that 
these two aspects, the goal and the process, are consonant, for when discussing education at 
the opening of Book VIII of the Politics Aristotle states that as regards the different regimes, 
“one should educate with a view to each sort, for the character that is proper to each sort of 
                                                          
1 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1252a 1-6. 
2 Ibid, 1328a 40-1328b 2. 
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regime both customarily safeguards the regime and establishes it at the beginning,” with the 
result that “the best character is always a cause of a better regime.”3 If education is the process 
by which the regime moves towards its proper end then the end is dependent upon the manner 
of education just as the manner of education is dependent upon the type of regime one desires. 
The goal that one is moving towards informs the manner and tenor of the growth within the city, 
but the manner and the tenor of the change also limits and informs the possible end. The 
implication, then, is that there is a certain necessary manner and tenor of change that will 
accomplish the best end. 
  Indeed, Aristotle devotes considerable time to the topic of regime change and growth in 
the Politics, and it thus follows that any commentary upon the end must also focus upon the 
means to achieve that end. Furthermore, just as Aristotle asserts that much attention will be 
paid to the ideal regime, he suggests that education, which this paper will argue is the proper 
method of change in a positive sense, or progress, tends to be overlooked. For he claims that 
the best laws are useless without proper education, but that the examination of education is 
“slighted by all.”4 This paper will examine the nature and manner of regime change, growth, and 
progress in Aristotle’s Politics. It will argue progress is a necessary good that the city must 
pursue as a component of its proper end, the promotion of the common good and the best life. 
Further, the paper will demonstrate that any change within the regime of the city must be 
concurrent with a change among the citizenry, as Aristotle repeatedly asserts that the 
happiness—that is, the exercise of the fullness of virtue—of the city is the same as that of the 
people.5 This in turn will demonstrate that any process of change must originate from within the 
city, rather than simply as the result of external force as some argue. Finally, this paper will 
argue that the proper mode of change is civic education, that is public and common for all, and 
                                                          
3 Ibid, 1337a 12-16. 
4 Ibid, 1310a 12-15. 
5 Ibid, 1323b 30-1324a 7. 
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that it is only this mechanism which is capable of producing the gradual progress towards the 
ideal regime necessary to improve the way of life of the citizenry without compromising the 
polis. 
 Several definitions and explanations should be offered at this point before moving 
forward. Throughout the course of this paper, terms used will correspond as closely as possible 
with the definitions that Aristotle offers for them. Polis, used interchangeably with city, refers to a 
self-sufficient political community aimed at the promotion of the highest common good, which 
Aristotle proffers as eudaimonia, or happiness in the sense of a complete flourishing in life, 
including both virtue and equipment. Virtue is excellence in action that results in excellence of 
character, both moral and intellectual, and in the case of the good person this is virtue not 
merely in any specific craft or activity but in fine and right action, encompassing courage, 
temperance, generosity, magnanimity, gentleness, friendship, justice, and the virtues of thought. 
Equipment refers to all of the necessary external conditions for happiness, such as a degree of 
wealth that allows for self-sufficiency and leisure. The politeia, or regime, refers to the 
organization of the political and cultural offices of the city, encompassing not only the 
authoritative governing body of the city but also the city’s way of life and the end that the city 
pursues based upon its understanding of justice. This paper deals at length with the concept of 
regime change, which will refer in the broadest sense to any change, no matter how small or 
large, in the governing structure, culture, way of life, or purpose/direction of the city. The term 
revolution, used by Aristotle to denote a change in the essential character of a regime, will here 
be used to imply a more substantial change in the regime than the broader term of regime 
change, but this does not necessarily mean a complete change in regime type. Regime growth 
will be used synonymously with regime change, with the word progress signifying any growth or 
change that brings the city closer to its proper end, that is, closer to one of the ideal regime 
types that best promotes the common good and the happiness of the citizens and the city. 
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 Moreover, it is necessary to delineate the meanings of the different types of regime 
change that will be considered. External regime change refers to any force that is able to alter a 
regime from the outside, be it Divine authority/revelation, conquest by another polis, a new 
founder or law-giver from outside the city, or any other instigator of change that is not endemic 
to the city. Internal regime change refers to any force that is able to alter a regime from within 
the city, whether this is under the control of the authoritative element of the city, in the case of 
new laws or education, or the result of internal factional conflict i.e. democratic partisans 
overthrowing an oligarchic regime.  
Paideia, or education, following both John Burnet and Carnes Lord refers to the practical 
art of the creation and promotion of virtue within men, representing two of the three possible 
sources of virtue for Aristotle, leaving nature aside, habituation, ethos, and argument, logos. 
Education, as John Burnet points out, has a dual purpose for Aristotle reflecting the dual nature 
of man’s soul (both appetites and intellect), on the one hand it is responsible for inculcating the 
type of character necessary for the city’s pursuit of the common good and on the other hand for 
the intellectual instruction necessary for the individual’s pursuit of the fullness of virtue. The 
former type refers to habituation, and will be glossed as moral or civic education responsible for 
civic or practical virtue, whilst the latter type refers to argument and will be glossed as 
intellectual education responsible for intellectual or philosophical virtue.6 A fuller discussion of 
the nature of education, both generally and in its two types, will follow in the body of the paper. 
 For the purposes of this argument the regime type considered will be that of the many as 
it approaches perfection. For Aristotle, there exist, as a simplification, six different types of 
regimes; these are based on the number of people involved in ruling and whether or not the 
regime is perverted in the end that it pursues. The possibilities, as far as the number of people 
                                                          
6 John Burnet, introduction to Aristotle, Aristotle on Education, trans. and ed. John Burnet, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1903), 1-2; Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press), 36-37. 
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who may be involved in rule, are the rule of one, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many. 
When the one rules properly, pursuing the common good, this is called kingship, when unjustly 
it is called tyranny. When the few rule with an eye to the common good, it is called aristocracy, 
when they rule in their own interest it is called oligarchy. The rule of the many, when carried out 
properly, is called polity, and when improperly, democracy.7 Indeed, Aristotle concedes that not 
only are there multiple regime types, but that there are multiple good regimes, the best regime 
simply or the best regime feasible, and there remains disagreement amongst commentators, 
based upon Aristotle’s own varied opinions, as to which segment of the polis rules in the ideal 
regime, the many, the few, or one.  
However, the form of progress discussed involves not only a move towards happiness, 
the proper end of all political activity, but also to political virtue, that which enables the city to be 
ruled properly and directed towards proper virtue. For Aristotle political virtue represents, at the 
least, the most authoritative of all claims to rule, greater than number, fairness, wealth, or 
strength, for rule of the city should be directed not merely at the existence of the city, but “with a 
view to the good life,” and as such “education and virtue above all… have a just claim in the 
dispute.”8 Therefore, whichever segment within the city, taken as a collective, possesses the 
greatest amount of political virtue merits being the authoritative element of the city. And political 
virtue is the virtue of practical wisdom, the virtue of ruling and being ruled in turn amongst 
equals, with a view to the good of the city of the whole, including both the rulers and the ruled. 
In this sense, political rule differs from mastery, which looks only to the advantage of the rulers.9 
In this sense, then, in any regime except the city in prayer the totality of the citizenry will not, 
barring an accident of fortune, all be possessed of political virtue. In such a case the 
authoritative element of the city will be at first the few but will, if the thesis of this paper is 
                                                          
7 Aristotle, Politics, 1279a 25-1279b 10. 
8 Aristotle, Politics, 1283a 25-26. 
9 Ibid, 1324b 32-35, 1325b 5-12. 
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correct, grow over time as more of the populace becomes virtuous to include an ever greater 
number. For, just as it is just that the ruled submit to a ruler who is greater in virtue, it would be 
unjust for the rulers to exclude those who become politically virtuous from having a share in 
rule, as all of those possessed of political virtue are similar in nature in the sense that they share 
in virtue and therefore have same just claim to rule. 
This is consistent with Aristotle’s earlier argument that only those who are naturally 
slaves may be ruled as slaves; any who possess virtue cannot justly be slaves, that is, “no one 
would assert that someone not meriting enslavement ought ever be a slave.”10 Indeed, Mary 
Nichols makes this connection, stating that “the exclusion of the many from rule is no more just 
than slavery,” but here perhaps does not stress the difference between the two examples.11 
Slavery is just when the slaves are not capable of virtue, and the exclusion of the many from 
rule is just when the many are not equal in political virtue to the ruler(s). But just as the master 
has an obligation to free those who are not natural slaves, the few have an obligation to include 
those capable of virtue. Moreover, mastery differs from political rule as noted above, and the 
rulers of the city are thus also obligated to attempt to instill political virtue in the ruled. Jeremy 
Waldron, Josiah Ober, William T. Bluhm, and Kevin M. Cherry also argue for Aristotle’s 
understanding of the capability of the many to rule in an ideal way, amongst others.12 A more 
detail discussion of the ideal regime, involving rule of the virtuous multitude, as well as the 
capabilities of the many, will follow in the body of the paper.  
It should also be noted, however, that aside from any reasons contained within the work 
of Aristotle this paper seeks to examine education and progress with a view towards the rule of 
                                                          
10 Ibid, 1255a 25-26; 1287a 10-16; 1325b 5-12. 
11 Mary Nichols, Citizen and Statesman: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 1992), 82. 
12 Jeremy Waldron, “The Wisdom of the Multitude,” Political Theory Vol. 23, no. 4 (1995): 564; Josiah Ober, “An 
Aristotelian Middle Way Between Deliberation and Independent-Guess Aggregation,” Stanford University, 
September 2009: 4; William T. Bluhm, “The Place of the ‘Polity’ in Aristotle’s Theory of the Ideal State,” Journal of 
Politics Vol. 24 no. 4 (1962): 746-47; Kevin M. Cherry, “The Problem of Polity: Political Participation and Aristotle’s 
Best Regime,” The Journal of Politics Vol. 71, no. 4, (Oct. 2009): 1411-1412. 
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the many for the simple fact that most modern regimes, that is regimes that exist 
contemporaneously with this paper, at the very least claim that they are some form of the rule of 
the many. Aristotle, for his part, does believe that there is a form of rule of the many that is 
decent, and as this paper will argue there is a certain form of the rule of the many which may 
exist as an ideal form of rule. Politics is, for Aristotle, a practical “science” to use that term 
loosely, meant to be actively applicable, whereas philosophy is a theoretical science concerned 
with knowledge itself. Political philosophy, although Aristotle does not directly define it this way, 
is in some sense the attempt to take that which is knowledge for itself and find a way to apply 
said knowledge practically. Rather than turning lead into gold, it is the attempt to turn spider silk 
into steel. Whether or not Aristotle believes that the active life is better than the contemplative 
life, and to argue for the former requires much in the way of logical acrobatics in the face of his 
assertion in the Nicomachean Ethics that the best way of life is the philosophical, the work of 
political philosophy is a good as it serves the highest good.13 As Cicero states, “We are led by a 
powerful urge to increase the wealth of the human race; we are keen to make men’s lives safer 
and richer by our policies and efforts; we are spurred on by nature herself to fulfill this 
purpose.”14 Thus, if the author endeavors to draw practical lessons from the work of Aristotle to 
‘increase the wealth of the human race,’ they must be applicable to current regimes that are, for 
the most part, at least nominally based upon the rule of the many. In the same respect, that is, 
with an eye towards practical application, this paper will examine not only the theoretical works 
of Aristotle (although this is the primary purpose) but will examine the classical city and the 
method and purpose of education as it existed at the time of Aristotle. 
Finally, an aside must be made to explain the consistent use of male pronouns within 
this paper. As shall be explained later, within the body of the paper, there are ways in which 
                                                          
13 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 1177a, 
1094b 9-11. 
14 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Republic, trans. Niall Rudd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), I.3.  
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Aristotle’s definition of the citizen can be expanded in the modern context to include women. It 
is, and this cannot be stated strongly enough, the personal belief of the author that this is the 
case. If there are any issues that the author must take with Aristotle, this is chief amongst them. 
It is the belief of the author that women are without a doubt equally capable of virtue, and virtue 
in the same manner as men. However, Aristotle himself considers only the male capable of 
reason. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the masculine will be used. 
 Before turning to the beginning of the argument, it will benefit those who do not inhabit 
the mind of the author to outline the shape of the paper to come. First, in Chapter I the concept 
of regime change in Aristotle’s Politics will be examined, entailing a more thorough definition 
than that offered above and examination into why and how regime change is possible. This will 
necessarily involve an explication of the nature of the city and man, as the regime is composed 
of men and operates within the city. Moving from man, to the city, to the regime in this manner 
reflects the order in which Aristotle moves from the man in the Nicomachean Ethics to the city at 
the opening of the Politics and thence to the regime. Furthermore, it is only by understanding 
the nature of the regime, defined as it is in relation to the city and to man, that one can 
understand the methods through which regimes can change.  Secondly, in Chapter II the 
different possible methods of regime change shall be considered with an inquiry into which 
method best suits the positive change that leads towards the ideal regime and the promotion of 
the highest human good. This will include an examination of the instances of regime change 
identified by Aristotle’s school in the Constitution of Athens, consideration of external versus 
internal sources of change, the role of the divine in regime change, and the importance of 
stability and the problem of factional conflict. In this manner the proper nature of regime change 
will become clearer, as the proper form of regime change must avoid certain ills as well as meet 
certain criteria. Next, in Chapter III, a consideration of the exact form of change that Aristotle 
believes is best, which this paper will assert is civic education. It will be demonstrated that 
education as regime change is capable not only of moving the regime properly towards its end, 
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but is also capable of remedying the problems faced by the regime, chief amongst them the 
philosopher’s desire to withdraw from the city and the spiritedness of the citizenry. Then, in 
Chapter IV, a discussion of what a program of civic education looked like in the classical 
Athenian polis and a description of what Aristotle believed such a program should look like. This 
will ground the analysis in historical context as well as reinforcing further the importance of the 
nature of man and the city to regime change. Next, in Chapter V, the proper end of regime 
change will be examined, that is, what sort of change is a good, towards what should it be 
directed, and how does it serve the highest good; this discussion will necessarily involve a more 
detailed discussion of the rule of the many as referenced above in relation to Aristotle’s ideal 
regime. This regime, the rule of the virtuous multitude, constitutes not only the ideal regime of 
the many, but the ideal regime possible. Finally, in Chapter VI, a concluding look at both regime 
change and civic education and what this tells us about the best regime and the implications for 
politics and education today.  
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Chapter I: Whether Regime Change is possible, and a Good? 
 
 Before undertaking to examine any further aspects of regime change and growth, one 
must first ascertain whether or not Aristotle believes that regime change—that is, the 
development of a given regime from its current state of existence into a more or less perfect 
form—is possible. Moreover, if such change is possible, why is it possible and what purpose 
does it serve, e.g. does it promote the good? The question is not, at first glance, a difficult one 
to answer as Aristotle devotes considerable time in the Politics to outlining how regimes may be 
sustained and how they degenerate. To paraphrase Harry Jaffa, if Aristotle did not believe that 
such change was possible, why write (or lecture) the Politics?15 But such a quick acceptance of 
the possibility of regime change does not really tell us anything about how regimes should be 
constituted, the city or the goal of the city, nor the proper method of regime change. 
 Rather, let us consider the possibility of regime change by first examining the 
relationship between the regime and the city. In this, of course, one must first understand the 
nature of the city. This paper began, as Aristotle began the Politics, with the assertion that the 
city is a community that exists for the purpose of the promotion of the highest human good; the 
city exists as a self-sufficient partnership meant to help its citizens flourish and live the good 
life.16 The city, however, is not “created” for this purpose, it is not artificial. Nor is the city divine, 
granted by the gods to man, except possibly in the sense that all things that exist, and existence 
itself, must have some first origin, and that the ideal city presented in Books VII-VIII is a city in 
prayer.17 Rather, as Aristotle states repeatedly, the city “exists by nature,” and not only does it 
exist by nature but serves as the necessary and proper end of all human relations and 
                                                          
15 Harry V. Jaffa, “Aristotle,” in History of Political Philosophy 2nd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, (Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Company, 1972), 84. 
16 Aristotle, Politics, 1252a 1-6. 
17 Ibid, 1288b 22. 
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communities.18 This does not mean, however, that individual cities are not constituted or 
founded, they are not eternal or fixed; indeed, Aristotle reserves special praise for those who 
found cities as “responsible for the greatest of goods.”19 But it is perhaps more accurate to 
describe cities as cultivated rather than created, for all natural things come into existence but 
they are not necessarily immediately complete. Aristotle compares the city to human beings, 
horses, and households, and states that their nature is in their completed state, as all things are 
defined for Aristotle by their end. The horse first exists as an embryo, then as a foal, a yearling, 
a colt or filly, and finally as an adult horse, that is a mare or a stallion. The horse is not “created” 
anew at each stage of its development though we may speak of each level of development as a 
new beginning but the horse remains the same horse. So the city progresses from individuals 
who cannot exist without each other to the family, the household, the village, and finally the 
city.20 However, as Mary Nichols notes, “unlike the growth of other natural beings… the 
development of cities is not inevitable.”21 This reflects the distinction that Aristotle makes 
between human beings and all other animals.  
All natural, living things share one end, that of growth and flourishing in the sense of 
mere existence, the end of the newborn horse is to grow into an adult horse, to live as healthily 
as possible in such a way as to put off death as long as possible. Humankind, too, shares this 
end—the baby grows into a child and eventually an adult, and endeavors to live as healthily as 
possible before the coming of death. So the first end of the city, as is natural to both man and 
beast, is to secure “living.”22 One must go even further with this statement, as Aristotle himself 
does, that is not only the first end of the city but the very reason for its generation; the city 
“com[es] into being for the sake of living,” just as its precursors the household and the village 
                                                          
18 Ibid, 1252b 30-35. 
19 Ibid, 1253a 30. 
20 Ibid, 1252a 25-1252b 30. 
21 Nichols, 17. 
22 Aristotle, Politics, 1252b 29-40. 
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came into existence to fulfill “daily needs” and then “nondaily needs.”23 On this reading, the city 
does indeed aim at the highest good and end of man, fulfilling the definition that Aristotle set 
forth at the beginning of the Politics, as he states that self-sufficiency is “an end and what is 
best.”24 And yet, Aristotle established in the Nicomachean Ethics that the proper end of man, the 
highest good, is complete happiness, or the activity of the soul in accord with the highest 
virtue.25 
If all things have one end, and the city comes into existence to fulfill its end, the securing 
of self-sufficient living, how can it also promote this second end? For Aristotle continues that the 
city that came into existence for the sake of living, “exists for the sake of living well;” he later 
restates this even more clearly by stating that the city “exists not only for the sake of living but 
rather primarily for the sake of living well.”26 The city has two ends: firstly self-preservation and 
self-sufficiency, secondly the promotion of the good life, and is capable of pursuing both of 
these ends. Now, it must be noted that the first end of the city appears to be what Aristotle 
refers to as a “lower end” that is “pursued for the sake of the higher,” second end, and by Book 
III he asserts, in the same chapter in which he restates the dual ends of the city, that the sole 
end of the city is the promotion of the good life. Here, however, Aristotle must, in some way, 
contradict himself as the statement, “the political partnership must be regarded, therefore, as 
being for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together,” seems to disregard the 
fact that the city originally came into existence for the sake of living.27 The answer, and 
resolution to this contradiction, comes from the fact that cities, composed of men, are in their 
nature like men who are composed of two parts and thus also, unlike all other living things, have 
two ends. 
                                                          
23 Ibid, 1252b 10-30. 
24 Ibid, I.2.9. 
25 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a 10-19. 
26 Aristotle, Politics, 1252b 30; 1280a 31. 
27 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a 15-16; Aristotle, Politics, 1280b 39-1281a 3. 
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For Aristotle states that men are made up of both body and soul, and that the soul itself 
is made up of both rational and non-rational parts; the existence of man encapsulates an 
inseparable duality.28 In the fact that man has a body and a non-rational part of the soul, he is 
like all other living creatures, and is thusly just as bound by his nature as all other living 
creatures. Men may come together in a city for the sake of living, and in this he may be 
comparable to herd animals or bees that join together for the sake of living in accordance with 
their nature, and indeed may even form cities as they are more self-sufficient and a better 
guarantee of life than villages. But because man is also possessed of a rational part of the soul 
he is also capable of transcending his original nature,i capable of not merely living, but living 
well, for rationality (logos) allows man alone to consider the “good and bad and just and unjust 
and other things [of this sort].”29 Not only is he capable of doing so, it is part of his very nature to 
do so as Mary Nichols points out, “humanity’s overcoming of nature in one sense is thus a 
means for fulfilling its nature in another.”30 The man who is incapable of transcending his 
original nature as body and non-rational soul is incapable of truly ruling himself, as he becomes 
a slave to his passions; he is the definition of the natural slave.  
The man who abandons the natural needs of his body and focuses only on the higher 
nature of his rational soul is likewise not a man, but a god. It is this distinction that is implied 
when Aristotle notes that, “he who is without a city through nature rather than chance is either a 
mean sort or superior to man,” and again, “one who is incapable of participating,” that is, the 
mean sort of man incapable of the use of reason, “or who is in need of nothing through being 
self-sufficient,” one who has completely transcended and thus abandoned the original nature of 
man, “is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.”31 The city is thus like man, it has not 
                                                          
28 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b 39-1098a 7. 
29 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a 1-18. 
30 Nichols, 18; see also Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C.I. Litzinger, (Notre 
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only the ability to transcend its original end but also an obligation to do so; the city that does not 
do so is not properly a city, hence Aristotle’s remarks in Book III regarding the difference 
between living together and living in a city.32 
This understanding of the duality of man and the city will continue to have serious 
implications for the undertaking of this paper, as shall be seen. But the upshot of the above 
discussion to our immediate examination of the nature of change within the city is as follows. 
Because the city is concerned both with living and with living well and because, like man, it is 
composed of both the rational and non-rational, it changes in two ways. As man changes both in 
body and mind, so the city grows by choice, but also by chance and organic development. 
Moreover, even a development that is the result of rational choice, for example the modern 
development of Internet technology, may change the city unintentionally by changing the way in 
which citizens are able to interact with one another—the choice was to develop the Internet, not 
to explicitly refashion the manner of citizen interaction that arose as a result. Additionally, 
because the city is composed of men, and men grow old and die, the composition of the city is 
constantly changing. This does not mean that the city of 350 BC is inherently a completely 
different and new city than that of 250 BC, but certain aspects of the city will have changed; 
Aristotle compares the city to a river or a spring that remains the same although the water itself 
is forever moving, and eventually asserts that its only primarily when the regime changes that 
the city changes33 However, these are changes, amongst many others of a more explicitly non-
human type such as environmental change, cannot be decided upon by the ruling element of 
the city.  
As well as accidental or organic change, there is also a second manner by which the city 
may change, rational choice as exercised by the ruling element of the city. This, in essence, is 
the political art—making, enacting, and enforcing decisions that should promote the common 
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good of the city. The regime, however constituted, is a reflection of the values of the people—
the end towards which they wish to direct their city and the understanding of justice contained 
therein, as well as the sum totality of the beliefs and way of life of the city.34 The regime is also, 
however, the authoritative element responsible for making decisions such as the distribution of 
offices, creating and enforcing the laws of the city, ensuring the self-sufficiency of the city, and 
most importantly, as Aristotle himself says, seeing to the education of the young.35 Aristotle 
moves fluidly from using the term regime to describe the whole of the political community to 
describing only the authoritative element of the city, as in Chapter Six of Book III, where 
Aristotle states that “the regime is an arrangement of a city with respect to its offices, particularly 
the one that has authority over all [matters]. For what has authority in the city is everywhere the 
governing body, and the governing body is the regime.” In his explanation, Aristotle immediately 
turns to looking at “what it is for the sake of which the city is established,” and it becomes 
apparent in the following paragraphs that the form of the governing body, the source of political 
authority that Aristotle calls the regime, is dependent upon the end agreed upon by the city. 
Indeed, only “those regimes which look to the common advantage are correct regimes 
according to what is unqualifiedly just, while those which look only to the advantage of the rulers 
are errant, and are all deviations from the correct regimes.”36 Any city that is ruled with a view to 
the private advantage is ruled by a regime in name only; in its essence said authoritative 
element is not truly a regime.  
It would seem, given that the regime is the source of political authority within the city, 
that only the governing body can be responsible for intentional change within the city. This is the 
point that Strauss highlights in his consideration of Aristotle’s Politics. Considering the 
relationship between the regime and the polis, Strauss argues that the regime is the “form” of 
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the city whereas the constituent inhabitants of the city are the “matter.” He claims that it is the 
regime, meaning the authoritative element, that is higher in dignity due to its more direct 
connection to the end of the city, stating that “the character of a given city becomes clear to us 
only if we know of what kind of men its preponderant part consists, i.e. to what end these men 
are dedicated.”37 In this reading, it is the regime as the authoritative element that is solely 
responsible for determining the end of the city and shaping the populace accordingly. In one 
respect, Strauss is correct, as it is only the authoritative element that controls the laws, 
education, defense, etc. of the city according to Aristotle, whether this is one man or the many. 
However, Aristotle acknowledges that there are various ways in which the authoritative element 
is itself shaped by the populace, as his lengthy discussion of regime preservation in Book V of 
the Politics indicates that the regime must make decisions that at the very least appease the 
populace, and at best work to reshape the regime so that it bridges the conceptions of justice 
and equality held by the rulers and the ruled.38  
Moreover, Strauss himself turns from this discussion of form and matter to a 
consideration of the nature regime change, using the historical example of France to underline 
his points. And here, indeed, in the history of France, one has some of the most striking 
examples of the ends of the city, and regime change, being directed not by the regime but by 
the populace, for in 1789 it was the people, and not the government, that determined the future 
destiny of France. Of course, once the people, or some segment of the people, had seized 
control they in effect became the regime of the city, but several distinctions must be noted. First, 
at the very moment of regime change, at that most crucial catalytic point, the direction of the 
regime was determined by those not a part of the governing body, whose beliefs and 
understandings of the end of the city and the means to achieve those ends were developed 
before they were in power.  
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Of course, Aristotle did not consider the French Revolution in his Politics, but he does 
discuss the problem of stasis at length, and acknowledges the ability of those that are without 
the regime, inhabitants of the city who do not have a share in rule, to violently upend the political 
order, noting that it is at least sometimes the result of those who wish to see the values and 
direction of the regime changed, as Stephen Skultety argues, that Aristotle believed that conflict 
between the rulers and the ruled is one of the most frequent sources of constitutional change.39  
In sum, the constitution of the regime is defined by two choices, that of the proper end of 
the city and the manner and actions whereby that end is pursued. These decisions, although 
made by the regime, are influenced by the populace, and when this is not the case violent 
factional conflict may occur. And yet, Aristotle asserts in the Nicomachean Ethics that 
deliberation, which must precede choice, can only be about “things that promote an end, not 
about the end,”40 and as Stephen B. Smith point out, this presents a problem of sorts when 
discussing regime change, as it implies that the end is never in question. Indeed, Aristotle 
assets that the goal of the city is always the promotion of the common good, happiness for all its 
members, in the opening of the Politics, and reiterates in Book VII “that everyone strives for 
living well and for happiness is evident.” Additionally, even in those regimes that are deviant, the 
ruling part of the city still aims at “advantage,” the same phrase that is used for proper regimes, 
they simply fail to aim at the common advantage.41 It is then, perhaps, not that the end itself is 
disputed, all aim at happiness, but that there is disagreement upon what precisely constitutes 
happiness, and surely this is evident from Aristotle’s discussion of happiness at the very 
opening of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he posits that while almost everyone agrees that 
happiness is the highest of goods, people “disagree about what happiness is, and the many do 
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not give the same answer as the wise,” and that some believe, mistakenly, that happiness is 
pleasure, wealth, honor, health, or Plato’s Idea of the good.42  
Strauss suggests, however, that just as Aristotle will demonstrate that all of these ends 
are in fact subordinate to true happiness, he is also “satisfied that there is no serious 
disagreement on this subject among sufficiently thoughtful people,” but Aristotle admits that 
cities are not always ruled by “sufficiently thoughtful people.” It is not only possible but evident 
that regimes may be constituted with one of these lesser ends as its goal; the regime of the 
Spartans is criticized because “the entire organization of the laws is with a view to a part of 
virtue,” and that they consider the “good things” that are fought over as “better than virtue.”43 
Bartlett suggests that regimes which incorrectly posit “that the part of excellence they call their 
own is the whole of excellence… would have to yield,” before those that possessed a true 
understanding of the whole of excellence, but that in reality Aristotle acknowledges that such a 
transition may be resisted, and even if it is not it requires the populace of the city to 
acknowledge the outstanding virtue of the new regime.44 Action to produce change must always 
occur, but this action is not always preceded by choice. 
Furthermore, as noted briefly above, there exist regimes that improperly understand the 
relationship between the individual and the city, in two distinct manners. The first, referenced by 
Strauss as typical of modernity, aims at the common advantage by purporting to secure, for the 
entirety of its citizens, the ability to pursue their own individual happiness, but Aristotle states 
that a partnership which exists for the security of possessions and the prevention of injustice 
between citizens is not truly a city but an alliance, in which law is merely a guarantee of the just, 
“but not the sort of thing to make the citizens good and just [emphasis added].” Alternatively, 
regimes are also flawed that fail to acknowledge the importance of individual happiness and aim 
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only at collective happiness and view all things in common, as Aristotle’s criticism of Socrates’ 
“communist” regime evidences, “it is impossible for (the city) to be happy as a whole unless 
most  [people], or all or some of its parts, are happy.” The proper regime, then, must be 
simultaneously directed at the active promotion of the common good as well as allowing for and 
promoting the individual good, it can neither “reduce a consonance to a unison,” nor “a meter to 
a single foot.” 45 The second mistake is to assume that it is enough for the regime to promote the 
happiness of one part of the city, most commonly this would be the happiness of the rulers but 
as Jaffa points out Aristotle also criticizes a sort of martyr-like rule that aims only at the good of 
the ruled, because individual happiness is achievable even whilst other individuals are not 
happy.ii  But the city’s natural end is the good of all its members, and so a proper regime must 
aim at the good of the whole city.46 All of this serves to demonstrate that there is no 
contradiction between Aristotle’s statement on deliberation, or that there is more than one 
proper end of the city or man.  
That regimes may change in regards to the actions and methods by which they pursue 
their ends perhaps needs far less explication. To begin with, it is consistent with Aristotle’s 
statement from the Nicomachean Ethics regarding deliberation referenced above. Secondly, 
Aristotle distinguishes the proper regimes after the way in which they distribute shares in rule, 
that is, the method by which the regimes pursue governance, suggesting that the foremost or at 
least most obvious difference between regimes is their manner of action. That is, while regimes 
are divided based upon the end which they pursue—the good of the many, the few, or the one--
-they are also divided on how they govern, by giving power to the many, the few or the one, and 
this style of governance constitutes a sort of method by which the regime pursues its end. 
Additionally, education, laws, military security, and all of the other concerns of the regime come 
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into being through action, and it is obvious even to the most casual of observers that different 
regimes have different modes of education, laws, and forms of military defense. And finally, just 
as Aristotle criticized the Socratic and Spartan regimes for their ends, he criticizes them for the 
means by which they achieve their ends.47 
A brief example of how this reflects upon the actual action of regime change is as 
follows. When men first came to live together it was in pursuit of the common advantage in 
respect to mere living; that is, the desire for self-sufficiency. This agreed upon end characterized 
the first regimes, which were ruled by kings, whom Aristotle characterizes in Book III as being 
first and foremost capable in matters of war, the distribution of land, and the founding of the 
city.48 As long as the agreed upon end of the city was merely living, this regime type was 
acceptable in that it was the best means of securing self-sufficiency. Kevin Cherry here argues 
that the move away from this form of kingship to other forms of rule reflects a change in the 
actions of the regime; self-sufficiency remains the goal of the city, but as the city develops it is 
better able to achieve self-sufficiency under a different form of rule and it is the end of self-
sufficiency that justifies this change.49 But, the move away from early kingship based upon 
paternal rule to political rule must also be based upon a change in the end of the city. For 
Aristotle states that once brought together men are able to use speech to reason about the 
good and the just; this will lead to political science, which will in turn lead people to understand 
that the proper end of the city is not merely living, but living well, and they will subsequently 
reorient the direction of the regime towards this end.50 The move away from early pre-political 
kingship, then, is for Aristotle based both upon a change in the direction of the regime as well as 
the actions (distribution of offices and responsibilities) through which it pursues that end. 
                                                          
47 Aristotle, Politics, 1279a 33-37, II.5, II.9. 
48 Ibid, 1252b 18-22; 1285b 5-12. 
49 Cherry, 1412. 
50 Aristotle, Politics, 1253a 14-19; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.2-3; Nichols, 35-36. 
Nunnally 21 
 
For Aristotle, the above-discussed is the manner in which regimes must change if they 
wish to pursue their proper end, the promotion of the common good which entails both the 
security of self-sufficiency for living and the promotion of virtue to allow for living well, that is, 
happiness. For Aristotle states that: 
There are two things that [living] well consists in for all: one of these is in correct positing of the aim 
and the end of actions; the other, discovering the actions that bear on the end. These things can be 
consonant with one another or dissonant, for sometimes the aim is finely posited but in acting they 
miss achieving it, and sometimes they achieve everything with a view to the end, but the end they 
posited was bad. And sometimes they miss both. In connection with medicine, for example, [doctors] 
sometimes neither judge rightly what the quality of a healthy body should be nor achieve what is 
productive in relation to the object they set for themselves. But in all arts and sciences both of these 
should be kept in hand, the end and the actions directed to the end.51 
 
The regime must understand the proper end of the city, and it must understand by what method 
and through which actions this end is best pursued, it must then actually choose to pursue this 
end, through the right actions, and it must actually execute these actions correctly.  A failure in 
any one of these areas results in the failure of the regime’s move towards the good. The 
example of the doctor not only makes clear the need for proper execution in all aspects, but also 
demonstrates the interrelation of the end and the means. If the doctor incorrectly believes that 
the end of human health does not involve the possession of legs, he may amputate his patient’s 
legs to achieve this end, in this case there is consonance between the means and the end but, 
because he assumed the end incorrectly, he has not actually promoted the true end of his 
patient’s health. If, on the other hand, the doctor correctly understands that the true end of his 
patient’s health involves the possession of legs, but he mistakenly amputates his legs 
nonetheless he has not only failed to promote the true end of his patient’s health but has, in so 
doing, changed the end which he was pursuing, as his patient’s health can no longer include the 
possession of legs. Certain actions of the doctor have the ability to alter the end pursued, some 
of these changes are correctible but some are not. Likewise, a city may make mistakes in 
relation to its end or actions that are correctible, but they may also make mistakes that lead to 
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the downfall of the regime, or, more gravely still, the destruction of the city. The only way to 
ensure right movement towards the good, not only in the governance of the regime but as 
Aristotle notes in all arts and sciences, is to ensure that both end and means are correct and 
compatible.  
As we have seen, then, regime change is possible. More importantly, however, an 
examination of the nature of man, the city, and the regime has led to an understanding of some 
stipulations upon how such change must occur if it is directed at the good. Man has a dual 
nature because he is possessed of both a body and a soul, and the soul is further divided into 
both rational and non-rational components. This dual nature leads man to have two ends, both 
living, and living well. Because man has two ends, the city also has two ends, the promotion of 
living and living well. Additionally, the city is divided into two parts, based upon the division of 
man, the rulers and the ruled. The regime’s existence is also twofold; it is both the sum of all the 
beliefs and way of life of the disparate elements of the city as well as the ruling element of the 
city. All of this means that men, cities, and regimes are capable of change in two manners. 
Because men and cities are natural, they change both through organic or non-controlled growth 
as well as intentional choice. Furthermore, change may arise from within the man or the city, or 
from without, in which case it is also beyond their control. Change within the city may originate 
from the ruling element or the ruled. The same is true for regimes, regime change may occur 
from within or without the regime, and in both cases this may be due to organic non-controlled 
growth or intentional choice. Change may occur in only one part of the regime, the rulers or the 
ruled, but the two elements should be in alignment in order to pursue the good. Likewise, 
regime change may involve change in the end of regime or in the actions to pursue this end, but 
again, the two elements should be in alignment in order to pursue the good. It is clear then, that 
not only is regime change possible, but also that when it is accomplished correctly it moves the 
city towards its natural end and is therefore a good. Let us turn, then, to an examination of these 




Chapter II: Methods of Regime Change 
 
 Let us begin our investigation of change by ascertaining whether it is better for change, 
in the city and the regime, to originate internally or externally. It is clear that change can in fact 
originate both within and without the city, as Aristotle acknowledges several different manners in 
which an external force may exert its influence upon the city, resulting in a change in the city or 
the regime. Amongst these, he notes the possibility of the influence of the divine upon the city, 
the possibility of a rival city asserting its will upon the city, and the more general possibility of the 
influence of chance.52  
All of these possibilities are further attested to in the Athenian Constitutioniii, wherein it is 
asserted that there have been eleven changes to the Athenian constitution since the city’s 
founding. The second change was brought about by Theseus; the demigod son of Poseidon 
who founds Athens by bringing together the twelve settlements of Attica and then gives Athens 
its first constitution.  Not only this, but, as Fustel de Coulanges asserts, Theseus was able to 
unite Athens politically at least in part because he was able to unite it religiously. Thucydides 
notes that Theseus established the Synoikia, the celebration of the city’s unification, as a 
festival in honor of Athena, the implication being that it was not only Theseus who was 
responsible for the city’s founding but also Athena.53 The tenth change, the institution of the 
Thirty, was brought about by Lysander’s victory over the Athenians in the battle of Aegospotami 
and the ensuing surrender of Athens to Sparta that ended the Peloponnesian War.54 The sixth 
change, the rule of the council of the Areopagus, was the result of chance, “not through any 
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formal decision,” as it had provided the money to outfit the fleet that won victory over the 
Persians at the Battle of Salamis.55  
All of these changes, however, are beyond the control of the legislator, and thus appear 
to be impractical methods of ensuring that the city progresses towards it proper end. For 
political science is concerned with action, the action of securing and preserving the good of the 
people and the city, and as we have seen above this involves making the proper choice in 
regards to the end and the actions that promote the end as well as the proper execution of 
those actions. Mary Nichols goes so far as to aver that, “It is such choice that defines human 
action…and political life as well. The city is an association of human beings rather than of 
slaves or animals because its members share lives lived ‘according to choice.’”56 Of the three 
examples of regime change given above, the legislator makes the choice regarding the end of 
the regime only in the first instance, but Theseus is not merely a man but a god, and Athena 
guides his choosing. Although Aristotle asserts that theoretically this sort of divine kingship 
represents the best form of rule, he also claims that such rulers do not exist, moreover, even if 
they did exist justice would necessitate that they were excluded from the partnership of the city 
due to their superior virtue.57 Because there is a lack of choice as regards the ends of the city in 
the reliance upon external sources of change, there is also no way of guaranteeing that the end 
pursued is that of the highest good.  
Progress is not inevitable; of the eight possible arrangements of choices made by the 
regime (the end, the actions, the execution of the actions, all rightly or wrongly)iv only one 
arrangement is guaranteed to yield the proper result. The Athenian Constitution glosses the 
changes leading to the rule of Theseus and the council of the Areopagus as good due to the 
good nature of the two regimes, but the change leading to the rule of the Thirty as degrading the 
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city due to the bad nature of their rule.58 Thus, if the regime is to be guaranteed to move the city 
towards its proper end, the cause of the change must be rooted in intentional choice, and this 
choice must therefore arise from within the city. 
The role of the divine in progress cannot be so easily dismissed, however, but nor can 
the relationship between politics and the divine in Aristotle be fully discussed here. Let it suffice 
to briefly examine the subject and some of its implications for the task at hand. Robert Bartlett 
argues that Aristotle, in his Politics, attempted to replace faith in the divine with the use of 
reason as the backbone of the laws as much as was possible. Indeed, the references to religion 
in the Politics are brief, especially when compared to Plato’s political works. Bartlett claims that 
Aristotle’s belief that the highest human happiness was possible in this world, and that this 
happiness was perfect in the activity of philosophy, leading to the conclusion that, “Aristotle's 
political science would therefore seem to deny the necessity, in order to be happy, of the 
support that providential gods supply. There is, so to speak, nothing left for such gods to do.”59 
Yet Aristotle, as Bartlett himself is forced to admit, does not drive religion from the city, 
and in his ideal city in prayer of Book VII Aristotle notes the need for “superintendence 
connected with the divine,” and that “it is proper for the gods to be honored by citizens.”60 
Further, in his description of the physical layout of the city in prayer, Aristotle creates a division 
between a “higher” city and a “lower” city; the division seems to reflect the division between 
man’s body and soul, as the “higher” city is concerned with living well and the “lower” city with 
merely living. The “higher” city contains a market which Aristotle “regard(s) as the one for being 
at leisure,” the lower market is constituted “with a view to necessary activities.”61 Moreover, the 
“higher” city contains the religious temples, the common messes for the “most authoritative 
official boards” and the priests, and present a place for the old men of the city to mix with the 
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officials of the city, just as the officials should mix with the young men of the city. The officials 
are present amongst the young men to “engender respect and the fear that belongs to free 
persons,” that is, to help to make them good citizens. Are the old men, those from whom the 
priesthood is drawn, meant to mix amongst the officials for a similar reason, to help them 
become good men? The whole “higher” city, which includes both the houses and 
representatives of the divine, is glossed by Aristotle as “the sort of place whose position is 
adequate for the manifestation of virtue.”62 It is still not clear, however, whether Aristotle 
believed that the divine could actually aid in the creation of laws, tempered by and in concert 
with reason, as Mary Nichols asserts, or was interested in setting up a sort of political religion 
that would give force to the laws and make the citizens loyal to the city, as Thomas K. Lindsay 
argues.63 
Whatever the exact relationship between the divine and the city, it is clear that Aristotle 
believes that the divine must be a accounted for by the city, capable as it is of inculcating virtue 
and as a concern of the same class of people who are capable of philosophizing and engaging 
in leisure. However, it is also clear that the divine alone cannot be responsible for progress, 
although it alone of all external forces always aims at the good insofar as it is truly divine and 
not merely bearing the name of the divine. And indeed, Aristotle criticizes those things that are 
called divine but are not, rejecting both the anthromorphization of gods and the deification of 
human beings.64  For the true nature of the divine is to be completely self-sufficient, always in 
activity, that of study, and thus in man’s pursuit of the highest good he is told by Aristotle to 
imitate the life of the gods, “for the whole life of the gods is blessed, and human life is blessed to 
the extent that it has something resembling this sort of activity.”65 But, for the reasons that were 
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noted above, man cannot rely upon the divine alone to be responsible for the progress of the 
city towards its proper end. Additionally, in the absence of a divine king, which Aristotle believes 
is not a possibility that can be counted on, it would be, as Bartlett points out, the work of men to 
interpret, promulgate, and enforce divine laws, so that “even if the law is as perfect at its outset 
as one would pray for, it must nonetheless be administered by subsequent generations of 
human beings.”66 Although one could respond to this claim by asserting, in the tradition of the 
Abrahamic religions, that subsequent generations of human beings are still guided by the divine 
or that all human laws are derived from divine law, Aristotle himself does not seem to make this 
conclusion regarding any of the laws he mentions.v The divine, then, like all other external 
causes of regime change, cannot be the proper cause of regime change that leads the city 
towards its proper end. 
 Given that Aristotle believes that one cannot rely on progress originating outside the city, 
it must originate within the city. Rather than resting on a negative proof, however, Aristotle 
demonstrates repeatedly throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics that this is the case. 
He claims that it is laws especially that have the ability to make the many good, and that 
therefore those who wish to improve the condition of the many have a need to study legislative 
science with the implication that one must be a legislator, capable of enacting good laws, to 
improve the city.67 And indeed, as has been noted above, the work of politics involves the work 
of intentional choice, and the only way in which progress can be attached to such a choice is if 
the choice is made by the regime. As Aristotle himself states, “the actions of the city belong on 
the one hand to the rulers, on the other hand to the ruled. The task of a ruler is command and 
judgment,” Aristotle insists that when it comes to distributing offices on the basis of merit and 
judgment of the just things, “it is not just to improvise.”68 The ruling element, in cooperation with 
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the ruled, is responsible for the three-fold choice referenced above—determining the end of the 
city, the actions that will promote the end, and the correct execution of these actions.  
 Moreover, Aristotle is concerned with the stability of the city, as an unstable city risks 
destruction and can compromise the first component of man’s end, for it is impossible to live 
well if one is not living. Thus Aristotle warns against factional conflict as a chief source of the 
destruction of regimes, and this factional conflict is in turn caused by differences between the 
parts of the city, whether this be a difference between “virtue and depravity… between wealth 
and poverty,” or for some other reason, the cause of all factional struggle, for Aristotle, is 
inequality.69 This is evident in the factional conflict following the rule of Cylon, when Athens was 
divided into “the notables and the masses,” and the “poor were enslaved to the rich,” and the 
factional conflict following the rule of Solon when the three factions of Athenians named 
themselves after their bases of power (the coast, the plain, the hill) but represented the middle-
class, the well-off, and the poor. In this second case, the factional conflict allowed Pisistratus to 
gain the support of the poor and seize control of Athens, establishing tyranny.70 
Further, Aristotle warns against making changes in the laws too quickly or broadly, or 
with the possible change not bringing enough of a benefit to the city to justify a change in the 
laws. For, as Harry Jaffa states, Aristotle believed that  “changing laws weakens their power, it 
loosens the bonds of the community, and this requires the greatest circumspection.”71 It is not 
that laws cannot be changed, indeed Aristotle argues that “it is not best to leave written [laws] 
unchanged (emphasis added),” and that “some laws must be changed at some times.”  
However, by changing laws too frequently, or too quickly, the ruling element risks habituating 
the ruled to not being ruled at all, to not following the laws, and thus threatening in the most 
                                                          
69 Aristotle, Politics, 1303b 15-17, 1301b 26-30. 
70 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 2, 13.4-16.9. 
71 Jaffa, 88. 
Nunnally 29 
 
extreme case the existence of the city, and in less extreme cases the ruler(s) will have lost the 
ability to improve the ruled.72 
 In fact, the ruling element must be prepared to make changes if they wish to preserve 
the regime and prevent factional conflict. For, as Stephen Skultety argues, “politicians who want 
to prevent stasis had better be prepared to intervene earlier rather than later in the social 
dynamics of their cities,” since once the conditions of inequality are set any small action, as 
Aristotle argues in V.4, can trigger revolution.73 The ruling element must ensure that the city is 
properly configured, that, so to speak, everything is in its right place. For Aristotle asserts that 
the causes of factional conflict can be either justified or unjustified.74 In the first place it seems to 
be the responsibility of the ruler to respond to the demands of the potential rebels by ensuring 
that shares in rule are justly distributed within the city, so, as was argued above, the ruling 
element must admit those who are equal in virtue to themselves to a share in rule. In the second 
place it seems to be the responsibility of the ruler to properly educate the potential rebels as to 
what justice is, so that they will not find occasion to undertake factional conflict based upon a 
false understanding of justice. Thus, the method of regime change within the city must not be 
based upon factional conflict, due to the evils of instability inherent in such a process, indeed 
Aristotle asserts that “whatever is engaged in factional conflict is weak,” and one need only 
consider Thucydides’ description of the Corcyran civil war and his observation that “every form 
of viciousness was established in the Hellenic world on account of the civil wars,” to understand 
Aristotle’s problems with factional conflict.75 Additionally, the proper method of regime change 
must be one that is gradual, or that at the very least is not so frequent and sweeping as to erode 
the foundations of the rule of law, that is, it must not weaken the ties of community nor the 
attachment of the populace to the laws. Finally, it must provide the opportunity for the ruling 
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element to prevent the vicious from threatening the city by making them less vicious and/or by 
teaching the populace what the true nature of justice is, thereby preventing the vicious from 
gaining power. 
 The proper method of regime change, then must arise from within the city. It must be a 
matter of deliberate choice on the part of the ruling element with a view towards the good of the 
whole city, and it must be a peaceful and gradual change that does not threaten the existence of 
the city nor weaken its communal bonds or fidelity to the law. It must, as was seen in the prior 
section, involve consonant change within the different parts of the city, and whatever method is 
used must be consonant with the end pursued. As has just been demonstrated, this 
consonance is assured by change directed by the deliberative element. The exact method, then, 
that should be used to improve the city, to bring about regime change, to move the city towards 
its proper end, is education. For, as Aristotle states, “the legislator must… make the education 
of the young his object above all.”76 And again, “the legislator would have to make it his affair to 
determine how men can become good and through what pursuits,” and for Aristotle men are 
made good through education and habituation.77 The process of education is gradual, not so 
abrupt as to weaken the city, and it presents an avenue for those who are capable of ruling to 
demonstrate their ability so that the ruling element may include them in rule. Education, 
however, also allows for the possibility of different types of education, reflecting the different 
parts of the city and the different parts of man. As Carnes Lord points out Aristotle notes that 
proper equipment (proper number of citizens, the size and nature of the city’s territory, access to 
the sea), is necessary for the best regime, and thus perhaps for progress also, but that this is 
due primarily to chance, “whether a city possesses the virtue necessary for a right use of that 
equipment is, however, no longer a matter of chance but of knowledge and deliberate choice.”78 
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Education is what allows for knowledge and proper decision-making, as Aristotle compares the 
Politics in the closing of the Nicomachean Ethics to the type of instruction that a doctor must 
receive if he wishes to heal others. Not only must the legislator be made good but the concern 
of the legislator is to make the city as a whole good. To return to Lord, “A city can become 
morally good only if its citizens are serious or decent persons (spoudaioi). What must be 
investigated, then, is the question how people become morally good.”79 Let us now turn to a 
consideration in greater detail of the possibility for education to promote the good, the exact 
nature of the proper form of education, and the different ways in which education is beneficial to 
the progress of the city. 
  




Chapter III: Civic and Intellectual Education 
 
Now, the use of education as a means of improving the city hinges upon the ability of 
education to improve the members of the city, those who are as individuals its constituent parts 
and as a whole form the community that is the city. In order to determine whether or not 
education can improve the city, one must first, it seems, answer several further questions. 
First—can education, through habituation and intellectual instruction, make any man virtuous? 
Second—if any one man can be made virtuous in this manner, can all men be made virtuous? 
Third—who exactly is a member of the city, that is, who is a citizen? And finally, what exactly 
does Aristotle believe is the relationship between the good man and the good citizen, and how 
does the nature of this relationship impact the answers to the above questions? 
It seems, at first, readily apparent that Aristotle believes that education can make man 
virtuous, after all he devoted his Nicomachean Ethics not only to the explication of the nature of 
the best life, but also as to how one could attempt to lead that best life. He states rather 
succinctly that the good life is that which is lived in accordance with virtue, and that the best life 
is therefore that which is in accordance with “the supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the 
best thing.”80 The virtuous person, according to Aristotle, is the one who repeatedly commits 
morally virtuous, just, and intellectually virtuous actions, actions that represent a mean in 
relation to certain states of the soul. For Aristotle, actions are the markers of virtue or vice. 
Using the example of bravery, Aristotle states, “Every activity aims at actions expressing its 
state of character, and to the brave person bravery is fine; hence the end it aims at is also fine, 
since each things is defined by its end.”81 This does not mean that bravery is fine only for the 
brave person, but shows how through the undertaking of brave actions a person becomes 
brave, yet at the same time the brave person undertakes brave actions because he is brave, 
                                                          
80 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a 11-15. 
81 Ibid, 1115b 20-24. 
Nunnally 33 
 
Aristotle makes a similar statement regarding generosity, but adds the caveat that it is not only 
the generous person who aims at what is fine in giving, but all other people who wish to be 
virtuous in their actions and thus become virtuous.82  Since it is through actions that we attempt 
to achieve our ends, it is also through actions that we develop our state of character, either 
virtuous or vicious, yet it is based on the state of our character that we determine which actions 
to undertake.  
For Aristotle virtue and vice are dynamic and reciprocal in relation to action. As to how 
one becomes virtuous either in thought or character, Aristotle states, “Virtue of thought arises 
and grows mostly from teaching, and hence needs experience and time. Virtue of character 
results from habit… Hence it is also clear that none of the virtues of character arise in us 
naturally.”83 Aristotle farther states that when we desire an end, then think about and come to a 
conclusion on what we must do to achieve that end, our subsequent actions to achieve that end 
are voluntary since they are an expression of our decision as to what best achieves that end. 
Given that, “The activities of the virtues are concerned with [what promotes the end]; hence 
virtue is also up to us, and so is vice.”84  This means that any rational person is, at least at some 
point in their life, capable of moving either towards or away from virtue. The answer to the first 
question, whether any person is capable of becoming virtuous through education, is thus 
answered. For a person may become virtuous through his or her own actions, based upon 
choices made regarding what is and is not virtuous. This understanding of what is and is not 
virtuous arises, as says Aristotle, from either education or habituation, from being told or being 
shown by another what is and is not virtuous. 
However, this answer immediately provides a negative response to the second question. 
If only rational actors are capable of becoming virtuous, this necessarily excludes all those 
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whom Aristotle considers natural slaves, those that are not capable of reason or who are not 
capable of fidelity to reason. Moreover, the truly virtuous man possesses virtue in two kinds—
moral virtue, or virtue of character, and intellectual virtue, or virtue of thought. Moral virtue may 
be acquired, as implied above, through a process of habituation with the use of reward and 
corrective punishment. Intellectual virtue, on the other hand, requires the use of teaching and 
scientific and/or rational calculation. Now, any rational person is capable of growth through 
habituation, as Aristotle notes that “we are by nature able to acquire (virtues), and we are 
completed through habit.”85 This does not mean that everyone will be able to perfect moral 
virtue through habituation, but that everyone is at least capable of achieving such virtue, aside 
from natural slaves.  
Intellectual virtue, on the other hand, is less readily accessible. In order to acquire 
intellectual virtue, one must be capable of being taught, that is, one must have the ability to 
listen to arguments and to understand them, using the knowledge contained therein to build 
one’s own intellectual acumen. Yet Aristotle clearly states that, “Arguments and teaching surely 
do not prevail on everyone, but the soul of the student needs to have been prepared by habits 
for enjoying and hating fiercely, like ground that is to nourish seed.”86 Not all those who are in 
pursuit of virtue meet these prerequisites, and so Aristotle acknowledges that arguments will 
work on some, those that are “the civilized ones among the young people,” or those with a “well-
born character that truly loves what is fine,” but not on the many.87 The first, and clearest, 
prerequisite for intellectual virtue is the possession of moral virtue, something that anyone who 
has been properly habituated and educated can possess. But Aristotle does seem to argue that 
there is a second criterion for intellectual virtue. Now, intellectual virtue is divided by Aristotle 
into five types: craft (techne), scientific knowledge (episteme), prudence (phronesis), wisdom 
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(sophia), and understanding (nous).88  Of these, it is prudence, or practical wisdom, which is 
necessary for the proper synthesis of the moral virtues as well as the ability to understand which 
actions lead to what is fine.89 Prudence is also the virtue of thought that allows for participation 
in politics. And indeed, prudence is achievable by all those possessed of moral virtue. The 
theoretical virtues of wisdom and understanding, however, do not seem to be achievable by all. 
Aristotle does not ever assert this directly, but there seems to be plenty of secondary evidence. 
In his discussion of wisdom, Aristotle asserts that wisdom is concerned with knowledge that is, 
“extraordinary, amazing, difficult, and divine, but useless, because it is not human goods that 
[the wise man] looks for.”90 Moreover, at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle asserts 
that a life lived in theoretical study “would be superior to the human level,” since “understanding 
is something divine in comparison with a human being,” and that “each person seems to be his 
understanding, if he is his controlling and better element.” The implication, however, is that this 
state of life in accordance with the divine, true happiness, is not easily achievable by many. 
Finally, the virtue of understanding is described as being “separate” from the compound of 
prudence and the virtues of character.91 If Aristotle does not explicitly state that some further 
precondition is necessary for the cultivation of theoretical virtue, he at the very least strongly 
implies that there is a marked difference between practical and theoretical intellectual virtue, 
and that the latter is found with less frequency than the former.  
If Aristotle asserts that is attempting to move towards the best regime, so defined by its 
possession of the fullness of virtue, how can one proceed when the city itself is composed of not 
only those who have the ability to achieve fullness of virtue, but also those who do not have this 
capability? Further, even amongst those who can become truly virtuous, many will never 
achieve full virtue as even those who have a proper understanding of what is virtuous and act 
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upon this understanding accordingly require the fullness of time and a long life to become 
virtuous. How, then, can the city ever hope to approach virtue? 
The answer is to remember that the city is dynamic, not static, that it grows and changes 
with time just as its constituent members grow, change, and eventually die, to be replaced with 
the next generation. Thus whilst the city at any one point may be composed of x number of 
people capable of full virtue, and y number of people incapable of full virtue, in the next 
generation there may be x+1 and y-1 people in the city, wherein the number of people capable 
of virtue increases. Alternatively, however, there could be x-1 and y+1 people, in which case the 
city ceases to progress towards its ideal form. Progress, in this sense, is not inevitable, but it is 
possible. Indeed, Aristotle sets forth the requirements for intellectual virtue and how they may 
be obtained. The “truly fortunate ones” are those who are born with a natural predisposition 
towards the good, but Aristotle acknowledges that this cannot be controlled, as it is the result of 
“some divine cause in those who have it.”92 But even those without the blessing of nature can 
be capable of intellectual virtue, provided that they are raised under the correct laws, as laws 
that properly habituate one towards what is fine and away from what is bad in youth will prepare 
one for intellectual virtue.  
Here, one may return to Aristotle’s farming analogy. Some soil is, due to its location or 
some other natural factor, better suited to the growing of crops than the soil in other locations, 
such as the Great Plains today or the fertile river valleys of antiquity. This does not mean, 
however, that crops cannot be grown in other places. Although the soil of the west coast of 
Ireland is rocky and sandy, not naturally hospitable to farming, it can be made to grow crops. 
Through the careful removal of rocks and sand and the addition of fertilizer and soil from 
elsewhere, over time a small plot of land can be made arable, and over the generations this 
small plot can be enlarged. So Aristotle suggests that “laws must prescribe (people’s) 
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upbringing and practices,” and through the adherence to these laws—not only in youth but 
throughout one’s life—one can be made suitable for the reception of intellectual as well as moral 
virtue.93 However, Aristotle asserts that the excellent person is the only true judge of what is 
excellent, for what is excellent in virtue is most in accord with his person.94 Thus, it follows, the 
education that aims towards the creation of the ideal city—that which is most excellent—must 
be stewarded and developed by those that are excellent themselves, with increasing levels of 
excellence as education progresses. 
 Given that education is capable of making individuals morally good, it must be examined 
what the nature of civic education would have been for Aristotle, that is, what form it would take 
and to what end would it be directed? The first question that must be answered, as mentioned 
at the beginning of the chapter, is who exactly is to be educated? This raises further 
questions—depending on who is to be educated, are they all to be educated in the same 
manner, and will their education all be aimed at the same end? To begin with, it is clear from 
what was stated above that the city has no obligation to provide education for those who are 
natural slaves. Further the city, for Aristotle, has no obligation to provide an education for those 
who are not citizens, which, for Aristotle, excludes resident foreigners and women. In the end, 
however, the citizen is one who is “entitled to participate in an office involving deliberation or 
decision,” that is, one who is able to, through their actions, promote the common good of the 
city.95 Indeed, Aristotle himself admits that the definition of citizenship will vary dependent upon 
the form of the regime that rules the city, but that at the last the best city will not make a “vulgar 
person” a citizen; to be a citizen one must be capable of a share of rule, that is, capable of virtue 
to some degree.96 While who may or may participate in rule varies from city to city, in the best 
cities, as already established, the criterion for rule is the possession of virtue, and in the best 
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city all of those who are capable of virtue must be included in ruling, and therefore everyone 
capable of virtue must be a citizen. Susan Collins advances this claim to citizenship, and argues 
that in the best city, it must include even those who are not capable of a share in rule but who 
are capable of benefiting the city in some way, since even Aristotle admits that the city is made 
up of dissimilar parts, and proper justice demands that these people, if not given a share in rule, 
are at least given a share in the benefits of living in the city; presumably this would include 
education.97 Collins appears to be correct on this point, but as shall be demonstrated, this is not 
the only reason for the city to include these people in education. Finally, Aristotle does admit 
that even slaves and women, whom he views as incapable of the sort of virtue necessary to 
help promote the common good of the city, do merit some form of education, but that this 
education is a domestic affair and not the obligation of the city.98 
Now, the purpose of this paper is to, on some level, benefit the modern society in which 
the author resides. In such a society, we have realized (although it took us far too long to do so 
and the task is far from complete) that women are capable of promoting and sharing in the 
benefits of the common good. Thus, while this paper must continue to use masculine pronouns 
in accordance with the explicit statements of Aristotle, it is the author’s belief that the final 
criterion for citizenship—the capacity for virtue which makes one a useful citizen of the city—
includes women. The defense of this viewpoint would require more thought, research, and 
argument than can be properly presented in this paper. One, very brief, possible explanation is 
as follows. Margalit Finkleberg, in an examination of the civic conceptualization of arête, notes 
that in Greek civilization of the archaic and classical ages, there existed an ideal of man 
separate from religion and philosophy, and the popular concept of human excellence, or arête, 
came from this ideal. “According to this concept, arête is only valid when being proved in action 
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purporting to benefit the common good.” Finkelberg states that for that time, actions benefiting 
the common good included war and politics, and so arête applied only to, “Male citizens of the 
upper and middle classes and did not apply to those whose circumstances prevented them from 
exercising it, that is, slaves, women, and in most cases also the poor.”99 So, while in a historical 
sense the understanding of who was able to become virtuous was limited by social and political 
realities of the time, in a more abstract and theoretical sense we are left with the understanding 
that anyone who is able to contribute to the pursuit of the common good is able to become 
virtuous, at least in a civic sense.  
 If it is all citizens who must share in education, will this education be the same for all 
citizens? For Aristotle asserts that not all rational persons are capable of intellectual virtue, as 
all are capable of moral virtue. Moreover, there seems to be a contradiction between Aristotle’s 
comments about education in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. In the Nicomachean 
Ethics he states that “education adapted to an individual is actually better than a common 
education for everyone,” although he admits that this education must be grounded in a 
knowledge of universals, but in the Politics he states that “it is evident that education must 
necessarily be one and the same for all, and that the superintendence of it should be common 
and not on a private basis.”100 This seemed contradiction is not actually a contradiction however, 
if one realizes that Aristotle’s program of education is divided into multiple parts, something both 
Carnes Lord and Randall Curren agree upon, although I believe that there may be some 
oversight in both cases. Aristotle envisions first an education that corresponds to living simply, 
an education of the body and of useful things, and then an education that leads to living well, an 
education of the soul and of the noble things that leads towards virtue. The first education is 
useful not only for living, but also because it prepares the student for the second education.101 
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Aristotle makes this distinction multiple times, noting the difference between the education of the 
first seven years, which takes place at home, and then the difference between the ages of 
seven to puberty and puberty to twenty-one. He also states that the earlier education “should 
prepare the road for (one’s) later pursuits,” and that “education through habit must come earlier 
than education through reason, and education connected with the body earlier than education 
connected with the mind.”102 Due to the dual nature of man education must therefore be divided, 
but it seems that Aristotle separates it in more ways than Curren or Lord assert. All citizens 
must participate in the first education, that of the body, which is based upon habituation. 
However, it seems that Aristotle believes that all citizens should participate in the second 
education as well, as it is this education that produces moral virtue and phronesis, and Aristotle 
states that the young should be educated not only for what is “useful or necessary,” but also for 
liberality and nobility.103 
 Everyone, then, must participate in the education that makes one into a good citizen, 
and all three phases of education mentioned by Aristotle above are necessary to make one into 
a good citizen. But one must remember that Aristotle claims that there is a difference between a 
good man and a good citizen. Aristotle discusses this divide in Chapter Four of Book Three of 
his Politics, a chapter he begins by asking, “Whether the virtue of the good man and the 
excellent citizen is to be regarded as the same or not the same.”104 Aristotle states that, “It is 
possible for a citizen to be excellent yet not possess the virtue in accordance with which he is 
an excellent man,” for the virtue of a citizen is, “know(ing) and hav(ing) the capacity both to be 
ruled and to rule.” 105 The virtue of the good man, however, encompasses in its entirety the 
virtue of the good citizen, as well as all other virtues of thought, morality, and justice, so just as 
every square is a rectangle but every rectangle is not a square, every virtuous man is a virtuous 
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citizen but every virtuous citizen need not be a virtuous man. Presumably, then, the education 
that is individualized would be an education in the intellectual virtues, focused not on creating 
good citizens but on creating philosophers. 
 It is important for all citizens to share in education in another manner, beyond that of the 
instillation of moral virtue that allows for them to rule and be ruled in turn. For, as we have seen 
above, there exist multiple methods of regime change that must, in a sense, be guarded against 
if the regime is to properly move the city towards its highest end. For the legislator, this seems 
in part to involve the ability to make decisions properly, to respond to external forces and 
internal forces that threaten the existence of the regime, although this would presumably be 
included in an education that taught how to rule and be ruled in turn. For the ruled, this would 
involve obedience to the ruler as well as the ability to act in the manner required by the situation 
to preserve the regime, most notably this would include military service. Loyalty and love of the 
regime must be taught for the regime to survive, so that in the face of factional conflict or 
external force the citizens of the regime will rise to its defense. For just as Jaffa states that 
“except as he lives in a polis a man cannot live a fully human existence, he cannot function as a 
man,” it is also true that it is only under a certain type of regime that the city can be advanced 
towards its proper end.106 Moreover, this desire for the preservation of the regime also has the 
effect of, in deviant regimes, the ability to “move the legislator towards the good of the citizens, 
and thus the city as collective whole, through an appeal to his self-interest,” as Aristotle seems 
to argue that the ultimate solution to the problems that threaten the existence of the regime is to 
improve the city, moving it closer to its highest end. 
 Additionally, this education to love and be loyal to the regime helps to solve the 
problems of spiritedness and the philosopher. The philosopher, who has properly understood 
the best way of life as posited by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, desires to withdraw from 
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the active life and dedicate himself to a life of contemplation. This presents a problem for the 
city, not only a problem of unity and community, but that of losing access to its greatest 
assets—the philosophers, men like Plato and Aristotle, who have the most to offer the city in 
terms of wisdom and guidance but by their very nature are prone to withdraw from the city. This 
highlights the conflict between the good citizen and the good man. Most generally, the virtuous 
man will desire to, and attempt to, lead the life that most approaches eudaimonia, a life of study 
and contemplation, which may lead him to withdraw from public life and thus not take part in the 
activity o the city.107 For, as Collins points out, the magnanimous man is unlikely to be civically 
active, “Except when a great honor or work appropriate to his virtue is at stake, his singular 
dedication to virtue makes him tend toward inaction and idleness.”108  So too, the man who 
wishes to achieve the greatest amount of magnanimity, “Would need to deviate so far from 
justice—in wresting rule from those who possess it and who may have equal claim to it—as to 
degrade his own virtue.”109 However, Aristotle notes that the happy person is still human, and as 
such will require external goods, although only requiring external goods in moderation, at least 
one of these external goods, friendship, can only be obtained through contact with other 
people.110 As such the virtuous man who pursues the life of study will still be involved in civic 
life, if for nothing else but to secure friendship, and as a true friend the virtuous man will be 
concerned with the pursuit of the common good within the community, even if only due to his 
desire to see his friend(s) prosper, but due to his nature as a virtuous man he will still make 
decisions with a view to the common good, and not simply the good of his friend(s). This, 
however, is a somewhat clumsy guarantee of the inclusion of the philosopher in the active life of 
the city. The philosopher, however, would have undergone the same initial education as their 
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peers who were unable to continue their education in the intellectual virtues. The city must, 
then, at this common lower level, do as much as is possible to reinforce not only love and loyalty 
to the regime, but the good of active participation in the regime. The philosopher, brought up to 
value the promotion of the common good—and indeed Aristotle states in the Nicomachean 
Ethics that while it is good to acquire and preserve the good for an individual, “it is finer and 
more divine to acquire and preserve it for a people and for cities,”—will maintain some level of 
attachment to the regime and work, when necessary, to promote the common good.111 The 
proof, it seems, is in the pudding, as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle all endeavored to educate in 
not only purely virtuous intellectual matters, but also in active, political matters, and Socrates at 
least actively served as both a soldier and on the boule. 
 Now, the problem of spiritedness seems to loom as the polar opposite as that of the 
philosopher. Spiritedness, for Aristotle, is a sort of disposition that makes men “expert at ruling 
and indomitable,” it is a kind of inclination towards freedom but also towards affection and 
friendship, a kind of heightened passion in the attitudes of men regarding what they view as 
theirs, whether it be their regime, their home, or their loved ones (and that seems not unlike the 
nature of many New Hampshirites).112  As Carnes Lord puts it, “The human stock of the best 
regime must be spirited by nature if that regime is to survive; but the spiritedness threatens at 
the same time the very purpose or reason for being of the best regime.”113 The regime must, 
however, find a way to rule its citizens. The answer seems to be that in the process of education 
as described above, the regime must not only instill a love of the regime but also the 
understanding that the best way to govern and to preserve the regime, and the city, is for the 
citizens to rule and be ruled in turn. That is, it is only by allowing oneself to be ruled that one is 
able to best serve and preserve the things that one cares about. Spiritedness must be directed, 
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through education, to be hostile to rule only when that rule is bad, when it aims not at the 
common good of the city, but at some other end. Even then, however, proper education would 
demonstrate that the best method of change for those who care deeply about their regime 
would not be violent action but education. Finally, Aristotle implies that the spirited will act 
harshly only “if they consider themselves treated unjustly,” and as long as the spirited are 
included in the same education, and are accorded a share in rule as befits their virtue.114 
Now, Aristotle argues that the state is a better moral educator than an individual, since 
the state has a far greater power to compel people to do what is right, stating quite conclusively 
that, “It is best, then, if the community attends to upbringing, and attends correctly,” and that it is 
only if the community fails to do this that the individual should attempt to act as a moral 
educator, since any attempt at moral education is better than no attempt at all.115 Aristotle 
seems to believe that education should clearly be the concern of the state, but it remains to be 
seen in what manner this education will take place. 
 The first important aspect of this education is the necessity that it is public and common 
for all, for Aristotle states that, “Since there is a single end for the city as a whole, it is evident 
that education must necessarily be one and the same for all, and that superintendence of it 
should be common and not on a private basis.”116 Curren terms this argument in favor of public 
education the “Argument from a Common End,” and claims that this argument works on a 
number of levels for Aristotle. The argument seems to go as follows; that common education 
towards virtue will promote common participation in activities that promote the common end of 
the city, namely, the advancement of the common good.117 The idea that common education will 
lead towards cooperation in the achievement of the common good of the city is based on the 
idea that common schooling will promote concord among those who receive the common 
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education, since it will foster feelings of trust and equality among those who receive the 
schooling, and Aristotle claims that both trust and proportionate equality must be present for 
political friendship to exist.118 Aristotle points to the benefits of concord when he states that, “A 
city is said to be in concord when [its citizens] agree about what is advantageous, make the 
same decision, and act on their common resolution.”119 Now, the ability to achieve concord 
relies upon trust and proportionate equality among decent persons, as stated above. Common 
education will foster both trust and equality in a number of ways. First, trust will be promoted by 
the continued communal interactions of the students, as well as the mutual recognition that all 
the students are undergoing the same education towards virtue, and as such the students are 
able to acknowledge their mutual possession of virtue when they are successfully educated 
towards virtue, with each citizen knowing that every other citizen is undertaking or has 
undertaken the same education. To quote Curren, Aristotle believes that, “The only stable 
foundation on which trust may be established is a mutual recognition of virtue,” based on a 
statement made by Aristotle in Book Eight Chapter Four of the Nicomachean Ethics.120 In the 
same way, the shared manner of education will promote equality among those who are currently 
engaged in said education or who were engaged in it. 
  Common education, then, is beneficial due to the common nature of education but also 
because all those who receive it are taught the same things. The first matter that must be taught 
to all those who take part in such an education is the ability to rule and to be ruled in turn. This 
ability is necessary if the virtuous multitude is to rule, and as such it is imperative that all 
children learn how to do this. Now, the ability to be ruled, that is, obedience, can be taught to 
children as soon as they are able to interact with the world, through a process of habituation that 
curbs appetites, for as Aristotle states, if a child or the appetitive part of a man, “Is not obedient 
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and subordinate to its rulers, it will go far astray. For when someone lacks understanding, his 
desire for what is pleasant is insatiable, and seeks its satisfaction from anywhere.”121 Thus a 
child must be habituated to become obedient, and it is not hard to imagine how this is done, as 
to this day parents strive to teach their children the very same thing. When the child is old 
enough to begin schooling, the habituation towards obedience will be reinforced by the 
instruction of the teacher as well as the rewards and punishments that come along with 
following the instruction of the teacher. Finally, when the student is old enough to serve in the 
military, he will do so, for as Aristotle states it is especially during military service that one learns 
how to rule because one is ruled by others for the benefit of the ruled.122 In addition to learning 
how to be ruled, knowledge that contributes to learning how to rule, the students will be taught 
through schooling the art of the politics. 
 Now, as Tessitore points out, and as was mentioned above, not everyone is capable of 
being taught through the use of arguments based on reason, that which I refer to as schooling. 
However, the habituation mentioned above serves to educate those who are deaf to the 
arguments of reason, Tessitore argues that, “The salutary application of force is necessary not 
only for the city… but also and especially for individual citizens, since it encourages them to live 
in accordance with the best thing in them.”123 Habituation alone seems to be enough to cultivate 
moral virtues, since Aristotle claims that, “Virtue of character [i.e. of ēthos] results from habit 
[ethos]; hence its name ‘ethical’, slightly varied from ‘ethos’.”124 
 Education, then, is capable of creating virtue in individual members of the city. As such, 
it is capable of making the city more virtuous, that is, of moving the city towards its proper end, 
as the city is not only governed by a portion of its members but it is, as we have seen, the end 
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of the city to promote the common good of its citizens. While not all men are capable of attaining 
intellectual virtue, all are at least capable of moral virtue and the practical wisdom necessary to 
be ruled and to participate in rule. As the city progresses, however, this would entail as a matter 
of course proper education, and as the city comes closer to virtue it is reasonable to assume 
that a higher portion of the city’s populace will be capable of intellectual virtue. The city, as we 
have seen, will continue to grow organically, it is only through the gradual process of education 
that the regime may safely adapt as the city it governs changes, as well as making the city 
capable of withstanding external threats through the decision making capability of the ruling 
element and the loyalty and military service of the ruled. Proper education can also temper the 
problems presented by those who pursue the life of contemplation, as well as those who are 
spirited, while common education works to unify the city and create bonds of trust between the 
members of the city. Let us consider, briefly, the form of education of the ideal regime as well as 
the form of education that Aristotle would have observed in classical Athens, before turning to 




Chapter IV: Education in Athens 
  
In order to better understand Aristotle’s suggestions regarding a system of education, it 
is pertinent to examine, briefly, the system of education that was in place in Athens around the 
time that Aristotle lived in the city. Doing so illuminates the context within which Aristotle made 
his conclusions and grounds interpretation of his work in examples that would have been 
familiar to the Philosopher. Moreover, the systems of education examined can be divided into 
three parts—physical education, moral education, and philosophical education, a division that 
corresponds to the tripartite division of man into body, irrational soul, and rational soul. This in 
turn serves to further demonstrate the relationship between the different parts of the regime and 
the city and to show that it is only education that is able to properly bring all of these parts 
towards its proper end. Finally, Athens at the time was ruled by the many, identified as such in 
The Constitution of Athens, and thus the system of education corresponds with the regime type 
that this paper is most concerned with.125 
 Classical Athens did not have a system of common, public education such as that which 
Aristotle advocates. It did, however, have multiple education systems in place for the training of 
its citizens in the various roles necessary for the preservation of the city. Further, its citizens had 
access to various forms of private education, including Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum, 
for both the young and adults. The only area in which Athens did provide public education was 
military training in the form of “the ephebeia, which was publicly funded and compulsory for 
citizens aged eighteen to twenty.”126 Although focusing only on military training Aristotle heavily 
implies that such an education is beneficial for the city, not only in creating a capable military 
force ready to defend the city but also as a means of fostering community and virtue amongst 
those trained. He praises the common military training and the common messes of the Spartan 
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and Cretan regimes, insofar as the “soldiering life… involves many of the parts of virtue,” but 
criticizes them as far as they point only at war.127 Military training is meant to help instill the 
virtues necessary for participation in ruling and being ruled, not merely to create soldiers, as 
well as preparing soldiers for the enjoyment of virtue, for “the element of nobility, not what is 
beastlike, should have the leading role.”128 Kevin Cherry argues that Aristotle believes military 
training would prepare soldiers in three useful ways: 
First, it provides the necessary experience with particulars essential for phronesis. 
Second, it develops the habits of obedience to the laws as well as those of ethical 
virtue, without which there can be no phronesis. Finally, it offers the possibility of 
improving the capacity for judging well through the observation of the judgments of 
others.129 
 
Aristotle, then, approved of the use of military training as practiced in Athens, Sparta, and Crete, 
although this training had to be directed at what was noble, not at what was “beastly.” 
In addition to military training there did exist a system of formal education in classical Athens, 
but, as has been noted, this was private and not supervised by the regime. While Aristotle 
accepted private education, this was only for the final stage of education, that which leads to the 
cultivation of intellectual virtue, and was solely for adults. Aristotle states again and again that 
“education must necessarily be one and the same for all, and that the superintendence of it 
should be common and not on a private basis,” and that it is especially with a view to the young 
that the legislator must control education.130 However, this education must continue when 
citizens are older, and it is necessary that this too is governed by the regime through law.131 
This education would take the form of habituation and argument, and both in Athens as well as 
according to Aristotle such an education should include “letters, gymnastics, music, and 
drawing.” It is imperative, however, that this education is directed at the production of virtue and 
                                                          
127 Aristotle, 1270a 4-5, 1271a 40-1271b 5, 1272a 13-20. 
128 Ibid, 1338b 29-31.  
129 Cherry, 1414. 
130 Aristotle, Politics, 1337a 10-25; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1180a 30-35. 
131 Ibid, 1180a 1-5. 
Nunnally 50 
 
the ability to enjoy leisure, and not at lesser ends such as pleasure.132 Reflecting the dual nature 
of man, this education is broken down into different parts. The first level of education is 
concerned with the body, with living, and involves at the youngest ages the paternal instruction 
of the household and then moves, at the age of seven, to “gymnastic and sports training,” as 
“education connected with the body (must come) earlier than education connected with the 
mind.”133 There must then be education, the formal education of the mind, between the ages of 
puberty and twenty-one, with a view not merely to living, but to living well.  
Finally, as mentioned above, it is necessary for education to continue for adults. For 
some, this would entail the continued habituation that began at an earlier age. For others, 
however, those capable of intellectual virtues and the pursuit of the contemplative life, this 
education would include an education in philosophy. It is here that education may be private, as 
not all are capable of this learning and thus it cannot truly be public and common for all. It 
seems, however, that the state must still superintend this form of education, making certain that 
it is directed at the proper cultivation of intellectual virtue whilst reinforcing moral virtue. For 
aside from the criticism of private education at younger levels in regards to the unity of the 
citizenry, there is a criticism based on the fact that private education allows for teaching people 
“whatever private sort of learning (a private individual) holds best.”134 
 As well as a system of military training and formal education, Josiah Ober argues Athens 
had an active, engaged system of political education, that through the structure of its public 
offices and the participation of the citizens they received a form of education in the activity of 
ruling and being ruled. To quote, at length, Ober argues that the Athenian system of governance 
Provided citizens with an ongoing—indeed, potentially life-long—practical education 
in the workings of the democratic machine. The result was that individual Athenians 
became more politically capable—still amateurs in that they served occasionally and 
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in rotation, yet possessing some of the decision-making characteristics associated 
with experts.135 
 
Through service on the council and on juries, as well as other civic participation, the citizens of 
Athens were “educated” to become better active citizens. Aristotle seems, at the least, to 
support the understanding that such participation could create better politicians. As he states 
that “experience would seem to contribute quite a lot,” noting that people would otherwise not 
become better politicians through practice, so that “those who aim to know about political 
science would seem to need experience as well,” to be able to properly participate in ruling and 
being ruled one must actually actively participate in ruling and being ruled, for “those with 
experience in each area judge the products correctly and comprehend the ways and means of 
completing them.”136 The extent of this experiential learning depends upon the form of the 
regime, however, as a regime that was not governed by the many would only want to have 
those who do share in rule participate in governance. Allowing the many this experience in 
another regime would lead to their increased desire for a share in rule and would also increase 
the justice of their cause, potentially leading to factional conflict. The ideal education of the city, 
then, would include experiential learning-through-doing. 
Because of the way in which experience contributes to education, it is also necessary for 
the city to, in a sense, censor what its citizens are exposed to. The young, especially, must be 
exposed only to certain kinds of stories and music, and “generally, then, the legislator should 
banish foul speech from the city more than anything… and particularly from amongst the 
young.”137 This is consonant with the idea that the city must control the curriculum of formal 
education, ensuring that students are being taught proper virtue as well as loyalty and 
obedience to the regime. It also highlights the need for the regime to guard against external 
                                                          
135 Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 123. 
136 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1181a 10-12, 20-25; see also Curren 121. 
137 Aristotle, Politics, 1336a 25-1336b 6. 
Nunnally 52 
 
influences and change that is the result of chance. Proper education, including censorship, will 
help to prevent citizens from becoming bestial, just as education will allow the regime to 
withstand the tumults of fortune that could otherwise threaten the existence of the regime.  
 On the whole, the form of education in Athens was not too different from the ideal form 
of education offered by Aristotle. Both involved military training, formal education, and the 
education of experience. Whereas the military training in Athens was short-lived and not 
properly oriented towards virtue, however, in the ideal sense Aristotle’s system of education 
would include military training that was properly oriented towards the end of virtue. Formal 
education was left private in Athens; it was perhaps on this point that Aristotle disagreed most 
strongly, insisting for the need for a public education that was common for all. Finally, Aristotle 
like Athens understood the importance of participation in the regime as a means of education. 
This, then, would extend further to a system of “censorship” through which the legislator 
ensured that citizens were exposed only to positive influences—experiences and influences that 
served to cultivate virtue.  
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Chapter V: The Ideal Regime 
 
 Given that it is through education that regime change must properly occur if the city is to 
reach its highest end, it remains to be seen exactly what form this regime would take. Now, as 
was discussed above, the type of regime determines the method of education that is proper 
within the city. However, it has also been demonstrated that the method of education will 
determine the type of regime that is in place; the end is restricted by the means just as the 
means determine the end. It sufficed earlier to assert that this paper is concerned particularly 
with the rule of the many, as this established the type of education that would be discussed and 
the goal towards which the regime should move. Let us now turn to the specific end, the ideal 
regime, to determine whether or not education-as-regime-change can produce such an end and 
what such an ideal regime would look like. 
There is a certain permutation of the rule of the many that is of particular interest when 
considering Aristotle’s best regime. At various points in the Politics, Aristotle puts forth the idea 
that, “The many, of whom none is individually an excellent man, nevertheless can when joined 
together be better—not as individuals but all together—than those [who are best].”138 That the 
many, when coming together as a whole, can be better than either the one or the few, even 
when the many are not composed of excellent individuals, is an important idea in the 
development of the best city, as it puts forth the idea that on some level the group of people that 
controls the best regime is best not based on any of the inherent merits that belong to any of the 
groups that lay claim to rule, but on a new, and one hopes, broader and more just merit. For 
every group claims to rule on the basis of their merit as rulers, but the many, when taken as a 
whole, are able to claim their merit as being able to be virtuous in both ruling and being ruled, 
and that their ability to actively take part in both of these manners makes them more virtuous as 
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rulers. It must be determined, however, by what means this ability to exercise collective virtue is 
achieved. 
 For when Aristotle here discusses the rule of the many, he asserts that their claim to rule 
relies on their claim to merit not based on the fact that they are citizens of the city, nor on their 
presence as a majority within the city.139 Aristotle rejects these claims to rule, not in their entirety 
but as claims to total rule, due to what he perceives as a lack of justice in their claim to rule. For 
Aristotle, there does exist a certain merit in comprising the majority of the city, but this merit is 
not sufficient to excuse the perceived injustice of the many’s rule in this case. In Chapter Eleven 
of Book Three he states, “Having (the many) share in the greatest offices is not safe… On the 
other hand, to give them no part and for them not to share [in the offices] is a matter of 
alarm.”140 
 Rather, the proper and fuller claim to rule that the many, when they come together to act 
as one, put forth is that they are, again, when they come together to act as one, possessed of 
greater wisdom than any other subset of people. Jeremy Waldron codifies this as the “Doctrine 
of the Wisdom of the Multitude,” and states this doctrine as follows: “The people acting as a 
body are capable of making better decisions, by pooling their knowledge, experience, and 
insight, than any subset of them acting as a body and pooling the knowledge, experience, and 
insight of the members of the subset.”141 
Waldron is able to put forth this doctrine, and not simply that the many possess more 
wisdom as a whole than any given individual since this is dependent upon the happenstance 
that such a multitude arises but that when the multitude comes together it is able to actively 
create the virtue that they claim as their merit. He does so through a simple process of logic, in 
which the many are able to possess greater wisdom than the one due to their coming together 
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in greater numbers, so any subset of people that comes together will not possess as much 
wisdom as any larger set of people that has similarly come together to deliberate. 
 Now, it is important to ascertain the way in which the multitude is able to put forth such a 
claim, as the nature of the multitude’s, when coming together to act as a whole, wisdom may or 
may not rectify the problems of justice that other regimes face, as mentioned above. Tied up in 
this discussion is the examination of whether or not Aristotle actually believes that wisdom can 
be collective. What appears to be the most obvious (at least to me, as it is the first way in which 
I understood Aristotle’s argument for the capabilities of this specific multitude) is that when the 
multitude comes together to deliberate it brings together a myriad of different experiences and 
viewpoints and that all of these different insights come together to form one greater insight, and 
it is from this multitude of ideas and beliefs that the one idea or belief that best suits the situation 
will arise, while one man or a subset of men will not have as broad a swathe of ideas to draw 
upon and is thus less likely to grasp the correct idea in a given situation. Yet, this view of the 
merit of the multitude must certainly be incorrect, in essence it is a “best-guess” theory and one 
that fails to hold water from a rational and logical standpoint. It represents a political system that 
in some cases will fail to produce a proper solution to a given problem, and also removes the 
necessity of the multitude coming together to deliberate, for the final decision of the multitude is 
merely one of the original ideas brought forth by an individual. Aristotle argues that the superior 
ability of the multitude to judge correctly, he uses the example of works of art, rely on the fact 
that, “Some [appreciate] a certain part, and all of them all the parts.”142 So too Aristotle shows 
how if one person or the few in the governing body demonstrate they have superior virtue to any 
larger group of people in the governing body, then these people should have authority and not 
the remainder of the governing body.143  So Aristotle shows that the collective wisdom of the 
multitude is not merely a gathering of viewpoints and the selection of the best one, for if the 
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appreciation of only one part of a work of art is selected it is not enough to justify the many’s 
claim as better than the few or the one, but only when the opinions of the many are taken as a 
whole so they may apply to the whole work and they are thus able to judge it with greater ability, 
and so too if it is based on the mere selection of one person’s idea, then this person has shown 
he possesses greater virtue in regards to governing and thwarts the authority of the multitude, 
and so if this is the many’s claim to virtue then it is self-defeating. 
The merit of the multitude must be tied up in the act of its coming together as one, and 
not simply its existence as a multitude, for in various cases when referring to the merit of the 
multitude Aristotle is always careful to note that this merit exists when they are, “Taken 
together,” or when the many are “combin(ed) into one,”144 that they obtain this merit. The 
various ideas first put forth by the multitude are ideas that each individual member of the 
multitude has cultivated as an individual. It is only in the ideas developed by the multitude as a 
whole that are better than the ideas of the best men or man. Aristotle for his part seems to 
believe that wisdom can be viewed as collective, he compares the collective wisdom of the 
multitude to a potluck dinner, and claims that such a dinner may be better than a dinner 
prepared by a single person.145 It is not immediately clear how exactly they are comparable, but 
the focus seems to be on both the variety of foods in the dinner and the variety of ideas of the 
multitude, and that just as all the separate foods combine to make one great feast, the various 
intellects of the individuals involved may combine as a sort of collective wisdom. Aristotle 
returns to metaphors involving food when he claims that the mixing together of ideas of various 
degrees of merit, works in a like manner as when, “Impure sustenance mixed with the pure 
makes the whole more useful than the small amount of the latter, but each separately is 
incomplete with regards to judging.”146 Thus wisdom may be collective in the same way that 
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combining various types of food creates one meal, just as the food is capable of being 
combined into a whole and is better as a whole, so too wisdom is capable of being collective, 
and it is possible that it is better for it. As Josiah Ober puts it, “The group achieves its excellence 
of judgment as a group– it is not a matter of deferring to the single best judgment in the 
group.”147  
With this understanding in mind, there remain three possible ways in which the merit of 
the multitude is achieved, the first of which is a utilitarian argument. Mill, in his essay 
Utilitarianism, writes that, “Utility… holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”148 The multitude, 
then, when it comes together, is better able to understand which ideas will promote the greatest 
happiness while promoting the least unhappiness, since they are able to understand how these 
ideas will affect all the members of the multitude. This argument is not altogether without merit, 
and is indeed one way in which the deliberative multitude is better disposed to act in matters of 
social welfare as opposed to the one or the few. The goal of the city, for Aristotle, is to promote 
both virtue and the corresponding good life among its citizens, and so when it comes time to 
make decisions regarding the city, as Waldron states, “Discovering that certain political 
decisions make life disagreeable for many people may be relevant to the assessment of those 
decisions.”149 
This argument alone, however, is not enough to justify the merit of the multitude, for it 
only puts forth a lens through which the ideas of the multitude may be viewed, and then only in 
matters of social utility. Yet the city is concerned not only with social utility, and thus the 
multitude must deliberate not only on matters of social utility but on matters of virtue, on what 
the good life is, and how the good life is best achieved. These are, to return to Waldron, “Issues 
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which go beyond the mere accumulation of individual experiences.”150 For their part, the 
multitude seems better equipped to judge on certain matters of ruling due to their ability to both 
rule and be ruled, but it is only a multitude that is properly educated, through schooling and 
habituation, that is able to judge these matters well, but it will be shown how in this case they 
are better able to judge these issues than the one or the few. 
The second of the remaining ways in which the multitude may grasp its claim to rule 
based on outstanding merit has been labeled by many commentators as the “summation 
argument,” based on the following passage in Chapter Eleven of Book Three, 
The many, of whom none is individually an excellent man, nevertheless can when joined 
together be better—not as individuals but all together—than those [who are best], just as 
dinners contributed [by many] can be better than those equipped from a single expenditure. 
For because they are many, each can have a part of virtue and prudence, and on their 
joining together, the multitude, with its many feet and hands and having many senses, 
becomes like a single human being, and so also with respect to character and mind.151 
While this passage does suggest that the merit of the multitude is based on its coming 
together, and the coming together of its ideas, beliefs, etc., it has led some to argue that it is 
based on the mere addition of various ideas that the multitude’s merit is derived. This viewpoint 
is superior to the first I have offered, in that the aggregation of the various beliefs of the 
multitude does create something that is conceivably better than original ideas of the individuals, 
and does reflect the process of the multitude’s coming together. Yet, it too seems to fall 
somewhat short of the true merit that the coming together of the multitude offers, not necessarily 
through any inherent shortcoming in the process of aggregation but because a richer, more 
fuller process is available. If one wishes to go from point A to point B, and one is given three 
different methods of transportation with which to journey from point A to point B, method x, 
method y, and method z, each with its respective strengths and weaknesses, one could use all 
three methods of transportation to reach point B, starting with method x and abandoning it when 
one reaches it point of weakness to be replaced with method y, and repeating this process over 
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and over again each time one needs to journey from point A to point B. The overall method of 
transportation, then, may be termed method x+y+z. However, a more pragmatic and forward-
looking way in which to go from point A to point B would be to examine methods x, y, and z, 
note their strengths and weaknesses, and then create a new method, call it q, that combines all 
the strengths of x, y, and z whilst discarding their weaknesses, so that the trip from point A to 
point B requires only method q. 
 The true merit of the multitude, it would appear, is not merely in the aggregation of its 
ideas or the selection of the one best idea, but in the gradual creation of a best idea by the 
multitude, through the examination and synthesis of all the various ideas put forward by the 
members of the multitude, this may be termed the dialectical activity of the multitude. Aristotle 
claims that it is possible for the many to be better than the excellent few, “By bringing together 
things scattered and separated into one,” he does not, however, know whether or not this 
difference, “can exist in the case of every people and every multitude,” but he then states that, 
“nothing prevents what was said from being true of a certain kind of multitude.”152 So while 
Aristotle does not see a multitude acting in the above-mentioned way, he admits that it is 
possible. Waldron claims that Aristotle’s view is that the deliberation of the multitude is a method 
of, “Bringing each citizen’s ethical views and insights—such as they are—to bear on the views 
and insights of each of the others,” and in this process show the strengths and weaknesses of 
these insights, “providing a basis for reciprocal questioning and criticism, and enabling a 
position to emerge which is better than any of the inputs and much more than an aggregation of 
function of those inputs.”153 Waldron brings as evidence in support of his view the fact that 
Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics by examining what different sources have to say about 
ethics and happiness and the good life and moves from this towards his own conclusions, but 
he does not merely discard the opinions of others as he goes. Waldron uses the following 
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passage from the Nicomachean Ethics as support of this belief, that in regarding the various 
views put forth on happiness Aristotle comments that some of the views, “Are traditional, held by 
many, while others are held by a few reputable men; and it is reasonable for each group to be 
not entirely in error, but correct on one point at least, or even on most point.”154 Waldron 
concludes by stating that in the Nicomachean Ethics it is Aristotle’s job to synthesize the various 
viewpoints held on happiness, and in the case of the multitude it is the multitude as a whole that 
synthesizes the various ideas put forth, claiming that in the course of deliberation a consensus 
will emerge from the multitude on any given point.155  
While Waldron’s discussion of the multitude’s dialectical ability as quoted applies to 
matters of an ethical nature, the dialectic is not constrained to matters of that field. Waldron 
discusses the synthesis of ideas through the process of voting, and does not specify the nature 
of the vote, stating that due to the merit through which the multitude claim the ability to rule (that 
is, their ability to function as a whole and to achieve synthesis,) “The individual member of the 
multitude is required… not only to use his vote responsibly, but to use it in a way that interacts 
deliberatively with others,” and if the individual does vote in such a way then the, “Final vote in 
the assembly reflects a synthesis which is something more than a mere aggregation of its 
constituent parts.”156 Indeed, Aristotle’s gathering of constitutions and his subsequent 
examination of both existing contemporary constitutions as well as the regimes put forth by 
Plato in the Republic and the Laws within his Politics suggests that Aristotle believed this 
synthesis could occur in realms other than the purely ethical. 
The ideal regime, then, seems to be a form of the rule of the many in which the many 
are able, through dialectical activity, to govern in a form that is ideal. It becomes clear, then, that 
the more virtuous the multitude, the better the rule. Since it is through education that men 
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become virtuous, as well as regimes, it is clear that it is only through a proper system of 
education that a regime may reach this form. However, Fred Miller Jr., in his commentary on the 
Politics, notes that the idea of the rule of multitude when it comes together as a whole, “Fails to 
take into account problems of collective irrationality,” but then notes that the remedy for this is a 
mixed constitution “that prevents the sort of irrational excesses perpetrated under extreme 
democracy.” 157 Miller is right to point out that the rule of the multitude does not inherently 
resolve the problem of irrationality, a problem that encompasses problems such as the 
perversion of rule and the ostracism of the minority by the majority. The solution Miller presents, 
however, does not seem to be the correct one, since the presence of a mixed constitution 
implies that there will be at least two different sources of authority, and that one of these 
sources will advance it’s claim to rule in certain areas to the detriment of the other, and so in this 
way bring about the problems of injustice inherent in a city in which there are competing claims 
to rule. For if the one or few or the many who are qualified to rule do rule, then those who are 
not qualified are not given their fair share in rule because when acting together they have their 
own claim to rule based on their collective virtue, and their reception of an unequal share in rule 
is unjust. On the other hand, if all are given a part in rule, then those who are qualified are 
treated unjustly, since they are not the equals of those who are unqualified yet they are given an 
equal share.158 Rather than preventing the problem of collective irrationality, Miller’s solution 
heightens the possibility of factional conflict. 
 The correct solution to the problem of human passions is proper education and 
habituation towards virtue. If the multitude, as a whole, is virtuous, then it will not allow the rise 
of demagogues, the oppression of a minority or majority, or other varied but similar situations 
from arising that do not lead the city towards the common good. For a virtuous multitude will 
choose those things which promote the common good as well as the flourishing of the citizens 
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of the community, since both of these things are held to be good, and those that are virtuous 
desire to achieve that which is good and virtuous, because virtuous people desire to achieve 
happiness in the same manner as all people. Unlike people who are not virtuous, however, the 
virtuous man will be able to understand correctly what brings about happiness, since, “What 
appear pleasures to him will also be pleasures, and what is pleasant will be what he enjoys.”159 
Finally, as we have seen above the city is ever changing in its composition and time, as it is 
wont to do, continues to move forward. The ideal regime, then, cannot be static, as the city itself 
is not static. Whatever the form of the ideal regime, it must be capable of responding to the 
organic growth of the city as well as the changes of time that affect the city. The ideal regime is 
one that is capable of growth, and the rule of the multitude collectively, made virtuous through 
education, is able to change and adapt. For education towards virtue will allow for proper 
decision making and adaptation, as while the equipment and circumstances of the city will 
change, its end remains the same, and the properly educated will understand how best to orient 
the regime towards its highest end in relation to the city’s current circumstances. The ideal 
regime, then, is marked by its activity, it is always in development, always continuing to 
progress towards virtue through the process of proper education. This ideal regime, then, is not 
only the ideal regime of the many, but the ideal regime simply.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusions 
 
 The end of the city is the promotion of common good of its citizens, that is, the promotion 
of virtue and happiness. The best regimes, then, must also share this as their end. As we have 
seen, it is not enough for regimes to posit the end correctly, however, they must also choose 
correctly which actions promote this end and then also execute these actions properly. Regimes 
have an obligation to pursue this good, and thus any regime that is not the ideal must change its 
form until it reaches an ideal state, that is, the form that is best able to promote the common 
good. As we have seen, the method of change necessitates the end that is achievable, the ends 
and the means must be consonant. Education, as we have seen, is the only form of regime 
change that properly moves the regime towards its highest end, and thus also moves the city 
towards its highest end. For the method of regime change must be internally controlled, for the 
ends and the means must both be chosen by the regime. The method of regime change must 
also be capable of adapting to or resisting the external and internal forces that may cause 
change that is not chosen by the regime. Not only is it education that allows for pursuit of virtue, 
that is, which allows the city to pursue its proper end, but it is also education that allows for the 
regime to choose properly. 
 Just as the method of regime change, education, must be consonant with the end it 
pursues, so the method of education must be consonant with the end that education pursues. 
Thus, a certain form of education is required. For Aristotle, this means that education must 
comprise military training, formal education, and experiential education. This education must be 
public, and common for all. It must include the inculcation of phronesis that allows for the ability 
to rule and be ruled in turn, as well as practical experience in ruling and being ruled. It must also 
promote unity, loyalty to the regime, the importance of actively supporting the regime, and faith 
in the process of education itself. It must also, however, aim towards the intellectual virtues, and 
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always seek to promote the totality of virtue, for activity in accord with the virtues is happiness, 
the end towards which all men and cities aim. 
 All of this means that the best regime is a certain permutation of the rule of the many, 
that based upon collective virtue which is a result of education. This regime must not be static; it 
must be dynamic, and capable of adaptation. For, as we have seen, the city, like man, has a 
dual nature, and thus changes in both ways. The regime must, therefore, be capable of 
adaptation in a choice-driven manner to correspond with the organic growth of the city as well 
as to resist outside sources of change. This regime, moreover, will be capable of resolving the 
problems of justice and inequality that Aristotle identifies in all non-ideal regimes, that is, that in 
any city there are various claims to rule and those who disagree with the recognized claim to 
rule view themselves as treated unjustly and unequally, but due to education towards virtue it 
may be recognized that virtue alone is the criterion for a share in rule, and all those who meet 
this standard are included in ruling. In the end, this regime would appear to be a developmental 
version of a mixed regime. Those citizens most capable as regards ruling will hold the highest 
offices, but when the multitude comes together as a collective it is even more capable of 
choosing rightly, as its collective virtue surpasses that of individual officials. Through the 
passage of time, as generations continue to be properly educated, it stands to reason that more 
people will be capable of intellectual virtue and that the regime, as a whole, will be able to 
govern better as it becomes more virtuous. 
 Education, then, is of paramount importance within the city. It represents the means by 
which the city is able to move towards its proper end, and proper education characterizes the 
best regime. Aristotle, understanding that cities are already in existence, understands that the 
ideal city cannot only be brought about through its foundation. All regimes are capable of reform 
and growth; indeed the wiping away of old regimes through violent revolution is actually harmful 
to the city and its citizens. Moreover, even if a city is founded properly, with an ideal regime, it is 
necessary for proper education to constitute a part of the regime, as it is through education that 
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individuals can approach virtue and happiness, and because it is through education that the 
regime may continue to be excellent whilst withstanding the ravages of time. Many of Aristotle’s 
recommendations for education do seem to be present within the contemporary American 
system. We have public education, although any observer of the current education system will 
admit that it is not common for all, and the existence of optional private education further 
underscores the need for reform in this area. Aristotle would certainly object to localized control 
of education, as this leaves the decision as to what is virtuous in essentially private hands, and 
he would certainly note with disapproval the disparity between education in richer areas and 
education in poorer areas. American institutions do provide for the experiential learning that 
Aristotle regards as valuable, particularly in jury duty which de Tocqueville notes as “the most 
energetic means of making the people rule, is also the most efficacious means of teaching it 
how to rule well.”160 Aristotle would certainly criticize America’s lack of uniform military training, 
and would note the disunity and lack of communal feelings that seem to be pervasive even on 
the state level. Most importantly, however, Aristotle would object to the fact that education in 
America does not seem to properly aim towards virtue. America may contain civic education, 
career-based education, education with a view towards knowledge, and education of the body. 
However, the state-run education system does not, in most cases, educate with the aim of 
virtue. And in the end, it is this that is most important for Aristotle. The city, the regime, 
education, all of these represent, at the last, a means to the end of happiness. All of these 
things are good only insofar as they serve the highest end of man, living well. The greatest 
responsibility of the regime, therefore, is to promote proper education towards virtue, as it is 
through this process that man achieves his highest end. 
i Jill Frank offers a slightly different view. She argues that for Aristotle, nature is not immutable but changeable, and 
that nature lies somewhere between necessity and chance, that is, what happens for the most part. By this reading, 
man is not obligated to transcend his original nature just as a tree need not necessarily grow to still exist naturally as 
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a tree, there is room for error. Frank’s article seems to suggest, then, that man’s nature is changeable, that those 
whose nature does not change are still men, that those men whose nature changes in such a way as to abandon 
completely their original nature are also still men, but that for the most part man’s nature will change in such a way 
as to produce the type of men for whom politics is a good. It remains, however, necessary that this change take place 
in order for man to achieve what Aristotle believes is his proper end. 
ii As Susan Collins points out, however, because human beings within cities live in community with others the 
perfection of happiness involves not only individual flourishing, but proper moral actions towards others as regards 
the virtue of justice. Collins, 53. Alongside justice, the virtues of generosity, magnanimity, and friendship dictate 
that perfect happiness entails the promotion of the happiness of others, although not all. Still, unlike the city, 
individual perfection can occur outside of the perfection of others, even as the perfectly happy individual should be 
invested in the promotion of other’s virtue. Aristotle does, after all, suggest that not everyone can be happy, as it 
requires, alongside possession of the ability for theoretical study, self-sufficiency to allow for leisure and the 
fullness of life to enjoy said leisure. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1120a 24-29, 1124b 10-151170b 6-19, 1171a 
18-21, 1177b 5-26. 
iii The Athenian Constitution¸ elsewhere translated as the Constitution of Athens, was most probably not written by 
Aristotle himself. However, the work was attributed to Aristotle in antiquity, is consistent with the collection of 
constitutions referenced in the Politics, and was most probably composed by a member of Aristotle’s school. As P.J. 
Rhodes argues in his introduction, the work, written by a student of Aristotle’s, would have generally agreed with 
the thought of Aristotle and reflected his political outlook. None of the passages used in this paper appear to differ 
extremely from Aristotle’s thought in the Politics, and in fact the example related to the rise of the Council of the 
Areopagus is also present in the Politics. Regarding the authorship question of  The Athenian Constitution, see: P.J. 
Rhodes, introduction to Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, trans. by P.J. Rhodes, (London: Penguin Books, 1984); 
K. von Fritz, "Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography," University of California 
Publications in Philosophy 28 (1958) 113-138; W. L. Newman et al., “Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens,” The 
Classical Review, Vol. 5, no. 4 (1891): 155-169. 
iv The eight possible arrangements are as follows: Right end, right actions, right execution; right end, right actions, 
wrong execution; right end, wrong actions, right execution; right end, wrong actions, wrong execution; wrong end, 
right actions, right execution; wrong end, right actions, wrong execution; wrong end, wrong actions, right execution; 
and wrong end, wrong actions, and wrong execution. 
v Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica, makes the claim that all human actions are subject to the eternal law 
insofar as good actions are in line with the eternal law and bad actions represent a turning away from it, further that 
all human laws insofar as they are proper laws, that is that they promote the good and not the bad, are derived from 
the natural law. Thomas’ thoughts on law are here greatly simplified, of course, but they do represent a Catholic 
approach to the origin of law and they are heavily based upon Aristotle, in the relevant sections on eternal, natural, 
and human law Thomas repeatedly quotes Aristotle as well as Augustine. Thomas Aquinas, Summa of the Summa, 
trans. The Fathers of the English Dominican Province, ed. Peter Kreeft (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1990), 







Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and Edited by 
C.I. Litzinger. Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1993.  
 
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa of the Summa. Translated by The Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province. Edited by Peter Kreeft. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1990. 
 
Aristotle. Aristotle on Education. Translated and Edited by John Burnet. Cambridge: University 
of Cambridge Press, 1903. 
 
Aristotle. The Athenian Constitution. Translated by P.J. Rhodes. London: Penguin Books, 1984. 
 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1999. 
 
Aristotle. The Politics. Translated by Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
 
Bartlett, Robert C. “Aristotle’s Science of the Best Regime.” The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 88, no. 1 (March 1994): 143-155. 
 
Bartlett, Robert C. and Mary Nichols. “Controversy: Aristotle’s Science of the Best Regime.” The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, no. 1 (March 1995): 152-160. 
 
Bluhm, William T. “The Place of the ‘Polity’ in Aristotle’s Theory of the Ideal State.” Journal of 
Politics, Vol. 24, Issue 4 (1962): 743-53. 
 
Cherry, Kevin M. “The Problem of Polity: Political Participation and Aristotle’s Best Regime.” 
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, no. 4, (October 2009): 1406-1421. 
 
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Republic. Translated by Niall Rudd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998. 
 
Collins, Susan D. “Moral Virtue and the Limits of the Political Community in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48. No. 1 (2004): 47-61. 
 
Collins, Susan D. Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 
 
Curren, Randall R. Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education. Lanham MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 
 
Finkelberg, Margalit. “Virtue and Circumstances: On the City-State Concept of Arête.” The 
American Journal of Philology, Vol. 123, No. 1 (2002): 35-49. 
 
Frank, Jill. “Democracy and Distribution: Aristotle on Just Desert.” Political Theory, Vol. 26, no. 
6, (December 1998): 784-802. 
 
Frank, Jill. “Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature.” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 98, no. 1, (February 2004): 91-104. 
Nunnally 68 
 
Götz, Ignacio L. “On Aristotle and Public Education.” Studies in Philosophy & Education, Vol. 
22, Issue 1 (2003): 69-82. 
 
Jaffa, Harry V. “Aristotle.” In History of Political Philosophy 2nd edition, edited by Leo Strauss 
and Joseph Cropsey, 64-129. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1972. 
 
Lindsay, Thomas K.  “The ‘God-Like Man’ vs. the ‘Best Laws’: Politics and Religion in Aristotle’s 
Politics.” The Review of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1991): 488-509. 
 
Miller, Fred Jr. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
 
Nichols, Mary. Citizen and Statesman: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics. Lanham MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1992. 
 
Ober, Josiah. “The Debate over Civic Education in Classical Athens.” In Education in Greek and 
Roman Antiquity, edited by Yun Lee Too, 175-208. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic 
Publishers, 2001. 
 
Ober, Josiah. Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Ruderman, Richard. 1997. "Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment." American Political 
Science Review, 91 (June): 409-20. 
 
Salkever, Stephen. “Whose Prayer? The Best Regime of Book 7 and the Lessons of Aristotle’s 
Politics.” Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 2007): 29-46. 
 
Skultety, Steven C. “Delimiting Aristotle’s Conception of Stasis in the Politics.” Phronesis, Vol. 
54 (2009): 346-370. 
 
Smith, Steven B. “Goodness, Nobility & Virtue in Aristotle’s Political Science.” Polity, Vol. 19, no. 
1 (Autumn, 1986): 5-26. 
 
Strauss, Leo. The City and Man. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964. 
 
Tessitore, Aristide. “Making the City Safe For Philosophy: Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10.” The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 4 (1990): 1251-1262. 
 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Translated by Henry Reeve. Edited by Francis 
Bowen and Phillips Bradley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 
 
Too, Yun Lee. “Legal Instructions in Classical Athens.” In Education in Greek and Roman 
Antiquity, edited by Yun Lee Too, 111-132. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 
2001. 
 
Vander Waerdt, P.A. “Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Best Regime.” Phronesis, Vol. 30 
No. 3 (1985): 249-273. 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3 Chapter 11 of 
Aristotle’s Politics.” Political Theory Vol. 23, Issue 4 (1995): 563-84. 
